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Abstract
In the post-WWII era, most developing economies had decent but not spectacular
growth. The great majority of them are unlikely to transform into developed economies in
near future, judging from current income levels and growth trends and the following facts.
(i) The dual economic structure (the coexistence of the modern/formal sector and the
traditional/informal sector) is persistent. (ii) The educational level increased greatly, but
the growth of the skill level, especially when measured by the share of high-skill workers,
is modest. (iii) While wage inequality between workers with and without basic skills fell
greatly, the inequality between workers with basic skills and with advanced skills rose over
time, which might indicate that basic education has become less eﬀective in mitigating
poverty but taking further education is increasingly diﬃcult for the poor.
Why is the growth experience of typical developing economies unspectacular? How
is it related to the facts on economic structure, skill accumulation, and inequality? What
diﬀerentiates a small number of economies succeeding in the transformation from them? To
tackle these questions, this paper develops a dynamic dual-economy model and examines
how the long-run outcome of an economy depends on the initial distribution of wealth and
sectoral productivity.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: I25, J31, O15, O17
Keyword: dual economy, modernization, education, wealth distribution
¤Faculty of Economics, Kyoto University, Yoshida-hommachi, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto, 606-8501, Japan; Phone
+81-75-753-3532; E-mail yuki@econ.kyoto-u.ac.jp. Valuable comments from an associate editor and a referee
are gratefully appreciated. All remaining errors are the author’s own.
1 Introduction
In the post-WWII era, most developing economies had decent but not spectacular growth.
Except some oil-rich nations, only a small number of economies in East Asia and Europe
had persistent high growth and evolved into developed economies. With current income
levels and growth trends, the great majority of developing economies are unlikely to achieve
such transformation in near future.
The following facts on typical developing economies would corroborate such negative
prospect. First, the dual economic structure, that is, the coexistence of the modern/formal
sector characterized by advanced technology, large establishment sizes, skilled jobs, and high
wages, and the traditional/informal sector with the contrasting features, is persistent (La
Porta and Shleifer, 2008; OECD, 2009).1;2 Second, the educational level of the population
increased greatly, but the growth of the skill level, especially when measured by the share
of high-skill individuals, seems to be modest, considering that enormous gaps in cognitive
skills with developed economies remain (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008).3 Third, while
wage inequality between workers with and without basic skills (those taught in mandatory
education) fell greatly, the inequality between workers with basic skills and with advanced
skills rose over time (Colclough, Kingdon, and Patrinos, 2010).4 This might indicate that
basic education has become less eﬀective in mitigating poverty but taking further education,
particularly of good quality, is increasingly diﬃcult for the poor.
1To be exact, the modern-traditional classiﬁcation is mainly based on technologies, while the formal-
informal one is mainly based on oﬃcial registrations of businesses, so they are distinct. Firms with modern
technology may choose the informal sector due to heavy regulations or taxation (OECD, 2009).
2The traditional/informal sector can be divided into the urban informal sector, traditional agriculture,
and the household production sector (see footnote 6). Rapid urbanization lowered the share of agricul-
tural employment signiﬁcantly, but it did not raise the share of the modern/formal sector greatly in many
countries. According to OECD (2009), informal employment, deﬁned as the sum of urban informal-sector
employment and formal-sector one without social protection (such as social security beneﬁts) accounts for
the majority of non-agricultural employment in developing economies.
3According to Hanushek and Woessmann (2008), the share of students without basic literacy in cognitive
skills is more than 30% (as high as 82%) in most developing nations, while it is less than 10% (as low as 3%)
in developed nations. Further, the share of high-performing students in the skills is more than 10% (as high
as 22%) in most developed nations, while it is less than 1% (as low as 0.1%) in many developing nations.
Reviewing the literature, they conclude that there is compelling evidence that cognitive skills, rather than
mere school attainment, are strongly related to individual earnings and economic growth.
4Colclough, Kingdon, and Patrinos (2010) combine estimated returns to education in developing nations
from recent cross-section studies (32 studies for 35 countries) with those from earlier studies (more than 100
studies using data from the 1960s to early 1990s), and ﬁnd that, on average, the return to primary education
fell rapidly over time and became lower than post-primary returns, which, particularly the return to tertiary
education, fell very moderately. Since quality of education deteriorated over time in most developing nations
due to rapid population growth under harsh budget, quality-adjusted returns to advanced education seem
to have risen. They also review a limited number of country studies using time-series data after the 1980s,
which ﬁnd that the return to tertiary education rose greatly and the one to primary education fell.
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Why is the growth experience of typical developing economies unspectacular? How is it
related to the facts on economic structure, skill accumulation, and inequality? What diﬀer-
entiates a small number of the successful economies from them? To tackle these questions,
this paper develops a dynamic dual-economy model and examines how the long-run outcome
of an economy depends on the initial distribution of wealth and sectoral productivity.
It is shown that, for fast transformation into a developed economy, the initial distribu-
tion must be such that extreme poverty is not prevalent and the size of ”middle class” is
enough. Both conditions seem to have held in successful East Asian nations largely because
of extensive land redistribution and eﬀective public school system, where, as in the model
economy undergoing such transformation, inequality between workers with advanced edu-
cation and others fell over time (Wood, 1994). In contrast, if the former condition holds
but the latter does not, which would be the case for many economies falling into ”middle
income trap”, the fraction of workers with basic skills and the share of the modern sector
rise greatly, but the fraction of workers with advanced skills grows moderately, inequality
between these workers and those with basic skills worsens, and the traditional sector remains
for long periods, consistent with the above facts.5 If the former condition does not hold,
which would be true for poorest economies, the dual structure and large inequality between
workers without basic skills and others persist for very long periods.
The analysis is based on a deterministic, discrete-time, and small-open OLG model. The
economy is inhabited by a continuum of two-period-lived individuals who are homogeneous
in innate ability. In childhood, an individual receives a transfer from her parent and spends
it on assets and education. Basic education, which corresponds to acquiring essential skills
taught in mandatory education, is needed to become a middle-skill worker, and more-costly
advanced education is needed to become a high-skill worker. No credit market for the
educational investment exists, so she cannot invest more than the received transfer. Since
she can spend wealth on assets too, she invests in education only if it is ﬁnancially accessible
and proﬁtable. In adulthood, she obtains income from assets and work and spends it on
basic consumption, non-basic consumption, and a transfer to her single child.
The economy is composed of up to two sectors, the modern sector producing good M
and the traditional sector producing good T . The modern sector using advanced technology
employs high-skill and middle-skill workers, and the traditional sector employs low-skill
workers. Both goods can be used for basic consumption, while only good M can be used
for non-basic consumption. In other words, goods for basic needs, such as clothing, food,
5Although skill-biased technical change is a possible contributor to the increasing inequality in recent
years, particularly in middle-income economies, Colclough, Kingdon, and Patrinos (2010) ﬁnd that this
trend started well before IT technologies became economically important (see footnote 4).
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and shelter, can be produced using either technology, while the advanced technology is
required to produce goods such as electric appliances and IT gadgets. It is assumed that
good M is tradable and good T is nontradable. The traditional sector produces goods for
basic needs using primitive technology, thus it corresponds to the urban informal sector,
traditional agriculture, and the household production sector in real economy, all of which
supply goods mainly for domestic markets.6 By contrast, the modern sector corresponds
to modern manufacturing and commercial agriculture, which compete more directly with
foreign producers. If good T is relatively cheap, only the traditional sector supplies goods
for basic consumption, otherwise, the modern sector too or only the sector does.
Because the distribution of wealth in the initial period is unequal and the inequality is
transmitted intergenerationally through transfers, generally, individuals are heterogeneous
in accessibility to two types of education. Hence, those without enough wealth cannot take
basic or advanced education even if the return to the education net of its cost is positive.
Their descendants, however, may become accessible to it if enough wealth is accumulated.
(Opposite is true for descendants of relatively wealthy individuals.)
Main results, which are concerned with the situation where sectoral productivities are
not very low, are summarized as follows. First, the model has four types of steady states,
which are diﬀerent in proportions of the poor (those who cannot access advanced education)
and the very poor (those who cannot access basic education), wage inequality, the size of
the traditional sector, etc. The best steady state (in terms of aggregate output, aggregate
net income, and average utility) has features of a typical developed economy: no poverty
(universal access to advanced education), low wage inequality (wages net of education costs
are equal), high relative price of basic consumption, and no traditional sector (goods for ba-
sic consumption are totally supplied by the modern sector).7;8 Other three types of steady
states share the contrasting features, but diﬀer in characteristics of poverty and wage in-
equality: in one type, no extreme poverty (universal access to basic education) but prevalent
mild poverty, and high inequality between high-skill workers and others and low inequality
between middle-skill and low-skill workers, features of many middle-income economies; in
another type, no mild poverty (those who can access basic education can aﬀord advanced
education) but widespread extreme poverty, and high inequality between low-skill workers
6The urban informal sector supplies basic nontradable services, such as petty trading of commodities and
basic meals, and basic manufacturing goods mostly for domestic markets. Traditional agriculture is operated
on a small scale by family farms and produces agricultural products mainly for basic needs of domestic
consumers. And, the household sector produces basic goods and services mostly for self-consumption.
7Since net returns of two types of education are equal, some individuals just take basic education.
8Although wage inequality rose in most developed economies in recent decades, the level of the inequality
is still much lower than a typical developing economy. Further, the cost of higher education too rose greatly
in many of the economies, thus disparities in wages net of education costs enlarged more moderately.
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and others and low inequality between high-skill and middle-skill workers; in yet another
type, as observed in poorest economies, pervasive extreme and mild poverty and typically
high inequalities among the three types of workers.
Second, to which type of steady states the economy converges depends on the initial
distribution of wealth. In particular, for the best steady state to be realized, the initial
distribution must be such that the very poor are not large in number and the non-poor
must be enough relative to the poor.9 If the initial size of the very poor is large, the dual
structure and large inequality between low-skill workers and others (especially, high-skill
workers) remain in the long run, i.e. the economy converges to either of the last two types
of steady states. If its size is not large but the non-poor are scarce relative to the poor,
the fraction of middle-skill workers and the share of the modern sector rise, and inequality
between middle-skill and low-skill workers shrinks over time. However, inequality between
high-skill and middle-skill workers worsens, and typically the traditional sector remains in
the long run, i.e. the economy converges to the second type.
These results are obtained from the model with time-invariant sectoral productivities.
When the productivity of the modern sector grows continuously over time, ultimately, the
economy converges to the best steady state from any initial condition, but the speed of
convergence depends critically on the initial condition and thus the qualitative results of
the constant productivity case hold approximately. Hence, as stated earlier, the model can
explain the facts described at the beginning.10
The main implication is that, for fast modernization of an economy, the initial distribu-
tion of wealth must be such that extreme poverty is not prevalent so that most people can
acquire basic skills and the size of ”middle class” is enough so that an adequate number of
workers possess advanced skills. Consistent with this and the above results, Hanushek and
Woessmann (2009), using data on international tests for 50 countries, ﬁnd that both the
share of students with basic skills and that of top performance have signiﬁcant eﬀects on eco-
nomic growth that are complementary each other. The model provides a sectoral-shift-based
explanation for their ﬁnding. The model’s implications are also consistent with ﬁndings by
Deininger and Olinto (2000) on relations among inequality, education, and growth, Easterly
9Note, however, that the economy can converge to the second and third types of steady states too,
depending on details of the initial distribution. The best steady state is more likely to be reached as the
size of the very poor is smaller and the proportion of the non-poor to the poor is higher.
10The paper also examines the situation where sectoral productivities are very low initially and grow
over time. When the modern sector’s productivity is very low, the best steady state does not exist and,
even with a good initial condition, the fraction of high-skill workers remains constant (that of middle-skill
workers rises) and inequality between high-skill and middle-skill workers (low-skill workers too after some
point) worsens over time. After the productivity reaches a certain level, however, the fraction rises, the
inequality falls, and the economy converges to the best steady state. The dynamics may resemble historical
experiences of many developed economies.
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(2001) on the importance of middle class in development, and La Porta and Shleifer (2008)
on the importance of educated managers in the expansion of the modern sector.11
In contrast, Galor, Moav, and Vollrath (2009) argue that, land inequality negatively
aﬀects the implementation of public schooling and structural change, whereas capital in-
equality among the landless has no eﬀect and greater capital holdings by large landlords
have a positive eﬀect. They develop a model in which human capital is important in manu-
facturing, but not in agriculture, and its accumulation is determined by public expenditure
on education whose level must be agreed by all groups, landowners, capitalists, and work-
ers. While the latter two groups support public schooling, landowners oppose it, unless
their capital wealth becomes large enough. A threshold wealth level for public education in-
creases with land inequality. They show that the implication that land inequality adversely
aﬀects educational expenditures holds for U.S. state-level data in the period 1880–1940. The
present model and their model have diﬀerent implications on structural change, which could
be empirically distinguished, as discussed in the result section.
The model abstracts from physical capital accumulation and population growth for
tractability and the focus on education and structural change. By contrast, Galor and
Moav (2004, 2006) develop models in which human capital accumulation starts only after
physical capital is accumulated enough in the course of development, and uniﬁed growth the-
ories surveyed in Galor (2005) model interactions among population growth, human capital
accumulation, and technological change to explain the transition from Malthusian stagna-
tion to modern economic growth. The last part of the paper discusses how they would aﬀect
results. Consistent with their works, the full modernization of an economy would not be
possible while the level of physical capital is low or population growth is rapid.
Aside from these works, this paper is related to the theoretical literature on dual econ-
omy models, such as Galor and Zeira (1993), Banerjee and Newman (1998), Lucas (2004),
Wang and Xie (2004), Proto (2007), Yuki (2007, 2008), and Vollrath (2009).12 Banerjee and
Newman (1998) examine implications of diﬀerences in technological and institutional condi-
tions between rural traditional and urban modern sectors for development and urbanization.
Lucas (2004) examines rural-urban migration in a model where urban workers allocate time
11Deininger and Olinto (2000) ﬁnd that growth is aﬀected negatively by initial land inequality (a proxy
for initial asset inequality) and positively by mean years of schooling, which in turn is negatively aﬀected
by the initial inequality. Easterly (2001) ﬁnds that a greater size of middle class, measured as the share of
income held by second through fourth quintiles of the distribution, is associated with more education, higher
income, and higher growth. La Porta and Shleifer (2008) ﬁnd a large diﬀerence between formal (modern)
and informal (traditional) ﬁrms in the human capital of their managers and indicates that this drives many
other diﬀerences, including the quality of inputs and access to ﬁnance.
12This paper is somewhat related to the theoretical literature on structural change, which is concerned
with the shift from agriculture to manufacturing and services in the process of development, such as Laitner
(2000), Kongsamut, Rebelo, and Xie (2001), Hansen and Prescott (2002), and Ngai and Pissarides (2007).
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between human capital accumulation and production. Wang and Xie (2004) explore factors
aﬀecting the activation of a modern industry using a static two-sector model with non-
homothetic preferences and uncompensated spillovers in the IRS modern sector. Based on
a three-sector (agrarian, manufacturing, and informal) model, Proto (2007) analyzes how
the initial number of unskilled landless workers, through its eﬀect on their bargaining power
against landlords and land rents, determines wealth and human capital accumulations and
development. Vollrath (2009) shows that the marginal product of labor in the modern sector
can be higher than in the traditional sector and such allocation is welfare-maximizing based
on a model in which individuals allocate time between market and non-market activities.
The more closely related are Galor and Zeira (1993) and Yuki (2007, 2008), which de-
velop dual economy models where, as in this paper, lumpy skill investment is constrained
by intergenerational transfers motivated by impure altruism and examine the relationship
between initial distribution and long-run outcome. Unlike the present paper, however, the
type of education (skill investment) is single, and either the traditional sector produces the
same good as the modern sector (Galor and Zeira) or only the sector produce goods for basic
consumption (Yuki). Their models cannot explore diﬀerent roles basic education and ad-
vanced education play in structural change and development. Further, they cannot capture
the shift of the production of goods for basic consumption from the traditional sector to
the modern sector with development, which is universally observed in real economy: in the
models of Yuki (2007, 2008), the traditional sector remains even in the best steady state.
The paper is somewhat related to the empirical literature showing the existence of multi-
ple growth paths. van Paap, Franses, and Dijk (2005) and Owen, Videras, and Davis (2009)
ﬁnd that countries can be clustered into multiple groups with distinct growth regimes. Alfo,
Trovato, and Waldman (2008) show that countries can be clustered into many groups with
diﬀerent levels of per capita GDP and with no sign of convergence across groups.
The paper is organized as follows. Since the model is a sequence of quasi-static economies
in which single generations make decisions, for ease of presentation, Section 2 presents and
analyzes the model without taking into account intergenerational linkages, then Section 3
considers the linkages. Section 4 analyzes the model and derives and discusses main results,
and Section 5 concludes. Appendix B contains proofs of lemmas and propositions.
2 Model
Although the model is dynamic, it is a sequence of quasi-static economies in which single
generations make decisions. Thus, this section presents and analyzes the model without
taking into account intergenerational linkages, which are considered in the next section.13
13All variables are presented without time subscripts in this section.
6
2.1 Setup
Consider a deterministic, discrete-time, and small-open OLG economy. The economy is
inhabited by a continuum of two-period-lived individuals who are homogeneous in innate
ability. Each adult has a single child and thus the population is constant over time. The
population of each generation is normalized to be 1.
Lifetime of an individual: In childhood, individual i receives a transfer bi from her
parent and spends it on assets ai and education in order to maximize future income. Ba-
sic education (costs em), which corresponds to acquiring essential skills taught in primary
and lower secondary education, is needed to become a middle-skill worker, and advanced
education (costs eh>em) is needed to become a high-skill worker.
14 Thus, if she spends ej
(j=h;m) on education, ai=bi¡ej, and ai=bi if she does not take education. Since no credit
market exists for the educational investment, she cannot invest more than bi, i.e. ai¸0.
In adulthood, she obtains income from assets and work and spends it on basic con-
sumption ciB, non-basic consumption c
i
N , and a transfer to her single child (b
i)0. A unit of
non-basic consumption is a numeraire. Characteristics of the two types of consumption are
explained later. She maximizes the Cobb-Douglas utility subject to the budget constraint:
max U=(ciB)
°B(ciN)
°N [(bi)0]°b ; °i 2 (0; 1); °B+°N+°b=1; (1)
s:t: P ciB+c
i
N+(b
i)0=wi+(1+r)ai; (2)
where P is the relative price of basic consumption and wi is her gross wage. By solving the
maximization problem, the following consumption and transfer rules are obtained.
PciB=°B[w
i+(1+r)ai]; (3)
ciN=°N [w
i+(1+r)ai]; (4)
(bi)0=°b[wi+(1+r)ai]: (5)
Production: The small open economy (thus interest rate r is exogenous) is composed of
up to two sectors, the modern sector producing goodM and the traditional sector producing
good T . The modern sector, which utilizes advanced technology, employs high-skill and
middle-skill workers, and the traditional sector using primitive technology employs low-skill
workers.15 Production functions of the two sectors are:
14The cost of advanced education includes the cost of acquiring the basic skill.
15Ray (1998, pages 353¡54) notes that the traditional (modern) sector can have several meanings: the
agricultural (industrial) sector, the sector employing older labor-intensive technology (new capital-intensive
technology), and the sector with traditional forms of organization based on family (with forms of organization
based on capitalist principles). This paper’s use of the terms is similar to the second classiﬁcation, reﬂecting
its concern on the coexistence of sectors employing diﬀerent technologies and types of workers in developing
economies. Unlike the more typical last classiﬁcation, as detailed below, the traditional sector in the paper
corresponds to the urban informal sector, which is organized based on capitalist principles, as well as the
traditional agricultural sector and the household sector in real economy.
7
YM=AM(Lh)
®(Lm)
1¡®; ®2(0; 1); (6)
YT =ATLl; (7)
where Lh, Lm, and Ll are numbers of high-skill, middle-skill, and low-skill workers respec-
tively, and Ai (i=M;T ) is the exogenous productivity of sector i.
16
Characteristics of goods and consumption: Both good M and good T can be used
for basic consumption, while only good M can be used for non-basic consumption. In other
words, goods for basic needs, such as clothing, food, and shelter, can be produced using
either technology, while goods such as electric appliances and IT gadgets can be produced
using the advanced technology only. Speciﬁcally, a unit of basic consumption can be fulﬁlled
by the consumption of either a unit of good T or µ units of goodM: The unit of measurement
of non-basic consumption is good M , so P · µ must hold.17
Assume that good M is tradable and good T is nontradable. The assumption would be
better understood by associating the two sectors with sectors in real economy. The tradi-
tional sector produces consumption goods for basic needs using primitive technology, thus it
corresponds to the urban informal sector, traditional agriculture, and the household sector.
The urban informal sector supplies basic nontradable services (such as retail of commodities
and meals) and basic manufacturing goods mostly for domestic markets, and accounts for
the majority of non-agricultural employment in many developing economies (OECD, 2009).
Traditional agriculture is operated by family farms and supplies products mainly for basic
needs of domestic consumers.18 And, the household sector produces basic goods and services
mostly for self-consumption, whose importance is signiﬁcant in developing countries. By con-
trast, the modern sector corresponds to modern manufacturing and commercial agriculture,
which compete more directly with foreign producers (La Porta and Shleifer, 2008).19
Determination of wages: Goods and labor markets are competitive, thus wages of
high-skill, middle-skill, and low-skill workers are given by:
wh=®AM
³
Lm
Lh
´1¡®
; (9)
wm=(1¡®)AM
³
Lh
Lm
´®
; (10)
16Because free international capital mobility is assumed, the production function of the modern sector
may be considered as a reduced form of the function that includes physical capital K as an input:
YM=gAM (Lh)¯(Lm)°(K)1¡¯ ¡° ; ¯; ° 2(0; 1): (8)
When (6) is the reduced-form function, AM depends positively on gAM and negatively on r.
17Good M is used for education too: the education cost is that of purchasing a ﬁxed amount of the good.
18As in Yuki (2007), traditional agriculture may be introduced as a separate tradable sector operated by
low-skill farmers. The analysis would be much more complicated without aﬀecting most qualitative results.
19In real economy, there exist skill-intensive modern sectors supplying nontradables. However, in develop-
ing countries, most of skill-intensive nontradables are public services, health services, and education, where
market forces have limited roles, while sectors such as ﬁnance and consulting services are limited in size.
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wl=PAT : (11)
For later use, denote wages of high-skill and middle-skill workers net of costs of education
by fwj=wj¡(1+r)ej (j=h;m), which are:fwh=fwh³LhLm´´®AM³LmLh 1´¡®¡(1+r)eh; (12)fwm=fwm³LhLm´´(1¡®)AM³LhLm ®´¡(1+r)em: (13)
Determination of P: When the relative price of good T is low, only good T of the
traditional sector is used for basic consumption and thus its market-clearing condition is:
PATLl=°B[whLh+wmLm+wlLl+(1+r)
P
ia
i]; (14)
where the right-hand side is obtained by aggregating (3) over the adult population. Denote
aggregate intergenerational transfers by B. Then,
P
i a
i = B¡ (ehLh+emLm) holds. By
plugging this expression, wl=PAT , and Ll=1¡(Lh+Lm) into (14) and solving for P ,
P =
°B
1¡°B
[wh¡(1+r)eh]Lh+[wm¡(1+r)em]Lm+(1+r)B
AT [1¡(Lh+Lm)] ; (15)
which is expressed as an increasing function of Lh, Lm, and B by using (9) and (10):
P =P (Lh;Lm;B)´ °B
1¡°B
AM(Lh)
®(Lm)
1¡®+(1+r)[B¡ehLh¡emLm]
AT [1¡(Lh+Lm)] : (16)
P (Lh;Lm;B)·µ must hold for P =P (Lh;Lm;B) to be true.
When Lh; Lm; and B are large, the demand for good T is high and its supply is low
enough that P (Lh;Lm;B) > µ holds. Thus, good M too is used for basic consumption and
P =µ holds.
From these results, the low-skill wage equals:
wl=wl(Lh;Lm;B)´
½
P (Lh;Lm;B)AT when P (Lh;Lm;B)·µ
µAT when P (Lh;Lm;B)¸µ : (17)
2.2 Equilibrium educational choices and wages
Individuals are heterogenous in received transfer bi. Let Fh be the proportion of those who
can aﬀord eh to become a high-skill worker, and let Fm be the proportion of those who
cannot aﬀord eh but can aﬀord em to become a middle-skill worker (thus Fh + Fm · 1).
Since an individual can spend wealth on assets too, she spends on education only if it is
aﬀordable and proﬁtable: an individual with bi ¸ eh spends eh only if fwh¸maxffwm; wlg,
and one with bi ¸ em spends at least em only if fwm¸wl. Thus, Lh·Fh and Lh+Lm·Fh+Fm
must hold, but Lh = Fh and Lm = Fm may not. This section examines how Lh, Lm, and
wages are determined depending on key variables in the analysis, Fh, Fm, and B.
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Figure 1: Shapes of critical loci determining educational choices and wages
2.2.1 Critical equations determining educational choices and wages
As can be seen from the above discussion, magnitude relations of fwh to fwm and of fwm to wl
at Lh=Fh and Lm=Fm are critical in determining Lh and Lm. For example, if fwh ¸ fwm andfwm ¸ wl at Lh=Fh and Lm=Fm, Lh=Fh and Lm=Fm hold in equilibrium, i.e. if each level
of education is proﬁtable when all individuals take highest aﬀordable education, they do take
it. Hence, combinations of Fh and Fm satisfying fwh( FhFm ) = fwm( FhFm ) and the combinations
satisfying fwm( FhFm ) = wl(Fh;Fm;B) are crucial. Denote FhFm satisfying fwh( FhFm ) = fwm( FhFm ) by
(Fh
Fm
)hm, and denote
Fh
Fm
satisfying fwm( FhFm )=µAT (wl when P =µ) by (FhFm)ml;µ.
Assumption 1 (Fh
Fm
)hm>(
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ:
The assumption implies fwh = fwm > µAT at LhLm = (FhFm)hm; that is, the highest (lowest) net
middle-skill (high-skill) wage is strictly greater than the highest low-skill wage.
As for Fh and Fm satisfying fwm( FhFm ) =P (Fh;Fm;B)AT (wl when P < µ), Lemma A1 of
Appendix A examines its existence and properties. In particular, the lemma shows that it
can be expressed as Fm=Á(Fh;B)Fh, where Á(¢) is a decreasing function.
From (17), Fm = Á(Fh;B)Fh , fwm( FhFm ) = P (Fh;Fm;B)AT aﬀects educational choices
when P (Fh;Fm;B) · µ; and FhFm =(FhFm)ml;µ , fwm( FhFm ) = µAT aﬀects the choices when
P (Fh;Fm;B) ¸ µ. Hence, relative positions of P (Fh;Fm;B) = µ and these loci are impor-
tant, which is investigated in Lemma A2 of Appendix A.
Figure 1 illustrates shapes of the critical loci on the (Fm; Fh) plane. (F
y
h(B) is the intersec-
tion of Fm=Á(Fh;B)Fh with
Fh
Fm
=(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ, which decreases with B.) Since P (Fh;Fm;B)<
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Figure 2: Educational choices when °B
1¡°B (1+r)B<µAT (Proposition 1)
(>)µ below (above) P (Fh;Fm;B) = µ, Fm = Á(Fh;B)Fh aﬀects educational choices below
P (Fh;Fm;B)=µ; and
Fh
Fm
=(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ aﬀects the choices above the locus.
2.2.2 Educational choices and wages
The next proposition presents educational choices and thus sectoral choices of individuals.
Henceforth, individuals with bi ¸ eh, those with bi 2 [em; eh), and those with bi < em are
named the non-poor, the poor, and the very poor, respectively.
Proposition 1 (Educational choices) Suppose Fh>0.
(i) If Fh
Fm
¸ (Fh
Fm
)hm, the non-poor are indiﬀerent between two education (fwh= fwm); the poor
take basic education, Lh=
(
Fh
Fm
)hm
1+(
Fh
Fm
)hm
(Fh+Fm)·Fh, Lm= Fh+Fm
1+(
Fh
Fm
)hm
¸Fm, and Ll=1¡Fh¡Fm.
(ii) Otherwise, the non-poor take advanced education and thus Lh=Fh.
(a) If Fh
Fm
2((Fh
Fm
)ml;µ;(
Fh
Fm
)hm), the poor take basic education, thus Lm=Fm and Ll=1¡Fh¡Fm.
(b) If Fh
Fm
·(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ,
1:When °B
1¡°B (1+r)B<µAT and Fh<F
y
h(B), if Fm¸Á(Fh;B)Fh, the poor are indiﬀerent
between basic education and no education (fwm = wl); Lm = Á(Fh;B)Fh · Fm; and
Ll=1¡(1+Á(Fh;B))Fh; otherwise, same as (a).
2: Or else, fwm=wl; Lm=[(FhFm)ml;µ]¡1Fh·Fm; and Ll=1¡f1+[(FhFm)ml;µ]¡1gFh.
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Figure 2 illustrates how Lh and Lm are determined depending on Fh and Fm when
°B
1¡°B (1+r)B<µAT .
20 As for Fm=Á(Fh;B)Fh and
Fh
Fm
=(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ, only portions of the loci that
are eﬀective (aﬀect the determination of Lh and Lm) are drawn.
When Fh
Fm
¸ (Fh
Fm
)hm, the non-poor (those with b
i ¸ eh) are abundant relative to the
poor (those with bi2 [em; eh)) and thus net wages of high-skill and middle-skill workers are
equated. Hence, some of the non-poor do not take advanced education (when Fh
Fm
>(Fh
Fm
)hm),
while all the poor take basic education, i.e. Lh<Fh and Lh+Lm=Fh+Fm.
By contrast, when Fh
Fm
< (Fh
Fm
)hm, the net high-skill wage is strictly higher than the net
middle-skill wage and thus all the non-poor take advanced education, i.e. Lh=Fh. As for
the poor, when Fh
Fm
2 ((Fh
Fm
)ml;µ;(
Fh
Fm
)hm) and thus the non-poor are not very scarce relative
to the poor, the net middle-skill wage is strictly higher than the low-skill wage and all of
them take basic education, i.e. Lm =Fm. When the scarcity is greater, i.e.
Fh
Fm
· (Fh
Fm
)ml;µ;
choices of the poor depend on Fh as well as
Fh
Fm
. For given Fh
Fm
, when Fh (thus Fm too) is
small, i.e. Fm<Á(Fh;B)Fh (Á(¢) is a decreasing function), the size of the modern sector is
small. Hence, the demand for good T , its relative price, and the low-skill wage are low and
thus Lm = Fm holds. In contrast, when Fh is not small, the low-skill wage equals the net
middle-skill wage and some of the poor do not take basic education.21
Proposition 2 shows how net wages depend on Fh, Fm, and B.
Proposition 2 (Net wages) Suppose Fh>0.
(i) If Fh
Fm
¸ (Fh
Fm
)hm, fwh = fwm = fwm((FhFm)hm)(> wl), and wl = °B1¡°B gwm((FhFm)hm)(Fh+Fm)+(1+r)B1¡(Fh+Fm)
when Fh+Fm<
(1¡°B)µAT¡°B(1+r)B
°Bgwm((FhFm)hm)+(1¡°B)µAT , wl=µAT otherwise.
(ii) Otherwise,
(a) If Fh
Fm
2((Fh
Fm
)ml;µ;(
Fh
Fm
)hm), fwj=fwj( FhFm ) (j=h;m), wl=P (Fh;Fm;B)AT when P (Fh;Fm;B)·
µ (possible when °B
1¡°B (1+r)B<µAT ), and wl=µAT otherwise, where fwh>fwm>wl.
(b) If Fh
Fm
·(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ,
1:When °B
1¡°B (1+r)B<µAT and Fh<F
y
h(B), if Fm¸Á(Fh;B)Fh, fwh=fwh([Á(Fh;B)]¡1) andfwm=wl=fwm([Á(Fh;B)]¡1) (<µAT <fwh); otherwise, same as (a) when P (Fh;Fm;B)·µ.
2: Or else, fwh=fwh((FhFm)ml;µ) and fwm=wl=µAT (<fwh).
Figure 3 illustrates magnitude relations of fwh, fwm, and wl and how the wages depend
on Fh, Fm, and B when
°B
1¡°B (1+r)B < µAT . In the ﬁgure, the locus P (Fh;Fm;B) = µ is
represented by a bold dashed line and P =µ on or above the line.
20Loci are drawn for given B satisfying °B1¡°B (1+r)B<µAT . When B increases, Fm=Á(Fh;B)Fh shifts to
the left and F yh(B) falls. When
°B
1¡°B (1+r)B¸µAT , P =µ always and the region Fh·F
y
h(B) disappears.
21Speciﬁcally, when the non-poor are not abundant (Fh < F
y
h(B)), P < µ and Lm = Á(Fh;B)Fh < Fm,
while when they are large in number (Fh¸F yh(B)), P =µ and Lm=[(FhFm)ml;µ]¡1Fh<Fm.
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Figure 3: Net wages when °B
1¡°B (1+r)B<µAT (Proposition 2)
When Fh
Fm
¸ (Fh
Fm
)hm, the non-poor are abundant relative to the poor (those with b
i 2
[em; eh)) and fwh=fwm=fwm((FhFm)hm) holds (the same level for any Fh and Fm in this region).
wl increases with Fh+Fm unless Fh+Fm is high enough that P = µ and wl = µAT hold,
because the non-poor and the poor receive the same level of net wage and thus the demand
for good T and P increase with Lh+Lm=Fh+Fm.
When Fh
Fm
< (Fh
Fm
)hm, the non-poor are scarce relative to the poor and thus fwh> fwm and
Lh=Fh. When the scarcity is not so great, i.e.
Fh
Fm
2 ((Fh
Fm
)ml;µ;(
Fh
Fm
)hm), the net middle-skill
wage is not very low and thus fwm > wl and Lm = Fm hold. Hence, fwh decreases and fwm
increases with Fh
Fm
, while wl=P (Fh;Fm;B)AT increases with Fh, Fm; and B, unless they are
high enough that P =µ. When the scarcity is greater, i.e. Fh
Fm
· (Fh
Fm
)ml;µ, the result depends
on Fh and
Fh
Fm
. For given Fh
Fm
, if Fh (and thus Fm) is small, i.e. Fm<Á(Fh;B)Fh, the result
is same as the previous case, whereas if Fh is higher, the demand for good T (and thus P )
is high enough that fwm=wl holds. When Fh<F yh(B) and thus Lm=Á(Fh;B)Fh (see Figure
2), fwh=fwh([Á(Fh;B)]¡1) and fwm=wl=fwm([Á(Fh;B)]¡1), that is, fwh decreases and fwm=wl
increases with Fh and B, while when Fh¸F yh(B) and thus P = µ and Lm= [(FhFm)ml;µ]¡1Fh,fwm=wl=µAT and fwh=fwh((FhFm)ml;µ), that is, the wages are constant.
To summarize magnitude relations of wages, when Fh
Fm
¸ (Fh
Fm
)hm, fwh = fwm > wl; when
Fh
Fm
< (Fh
Fm
)hm and either
Fh
Fm
> (Fh
Fm
)ml;µ or Fm<Á(Fh;B)Fh, fwh> fwm>wl; and fwh> fwm=wl in
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the remaining case.22
3 Dynamics
As noted earlier, the model can be considered as a sequence of quasi-static economies con-
nected by intergenerational transfers. Based on results of the previous section, this section
takes into account the intergenerational linkages.
3.1 Dynamics of individual transfers
Remember that the individual transfer rule is given by (now with time subscripts):
bit+1=°b[w
i
t+(1+r)a
i
t]; (18)
where wit and a
i
t are the wage and the asset of individual i born in period t¡1 and being
adult in period t, and bit+1 is the transfer to her child (whose adulthood is in period t+1).
Since ait depends on b
i
t, the dynamic equation linking the received transfer b
i
t to the
transfer given to the next generation bit+1 can be derived from the above equation. For a
high-skill worker, by substituting ait=b
i
t¡eh into (18) and using fwht=wht¡(1+r)eh,
bit+1=°bffwht+(1+r)bitg; (19)
where bit ¸ eh. °b(1+ r) < 1 is assumed so that the ﬁxed point for given fwht, b¤(fwht) ´
°b
1¡°b(1+r) fwht, exists. For a middle-skill worker, a similar equation with the net wage gwmt and
bit¸em holds. Finally, for a low-skill worker, since ait=bit,
bit+1=°bfwlt+(1+r)bitg: (20)
The equations show that the dynamics of transfers within a lineage depend on the time
evolution of wages, which in turn are determined by the dynamics of Fht, Fmt, and Bt.
3.2 Aggregate dynamics
Given the initial distribution of wealth over the population, Fh0, Fm0, and B0 are determined
directly, while levels of the aggregate variables in subsequent periods are determined by the
dynamics of the distribution of transfers. However, detailed information on the distributional
dynamics is not required to obtain main implications of the model. What is needed is
information on directions of motion of the aggregate variables, which is examined in this
subsection. For exposition, the dynamics of Fht and Fmt and those of Bt are examined
separately ﬁxing the other variable(s) ﬁrst, then their interactions are taken into account.
22A.2 of Appendix A examines how aggregate welfare, aggregate output, and sectoral composition depend
on Fh, Fm; and B: It is shown that increased access to education bringing higher net wages, i.e. higher
Fh+Fm when fwh=gwm, higher Fh and Fm when fwh>gwm>wl, and higher Fh when gwm=wl, raises welfare,
output, and the modern sector’s shares in production and basic consumption (when P =µ), while higher B
raises welfare, output when P <µ, and the consumption share, but lowers the production share when P <µ.
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3.2.1 Dynamics of Fht and Fmt
The dynamics of Fht and Fmt are determined by the dynamics of individual transfers. As for
the dynamics of Fht, if children of some middle-skill workers become accessible to advanced
education through wealth accumulation, Fht+1>Fht holds.
23 This takes places iﬀ there exist
lineages satisfying bit<eh and b
i
t+1¸eh. From (19) with fwht replaced by gwmt, the following
condition must hold for such lineages to exist:
b¤(gwmt) = °b
1¡°b(1+r)gwmt >eh: (21)
If the equation holds, Fht+1¸Fht, otherwise, Fht+1=Fht. (In the former case, Fht+1=Fht is
possible depending on the distribution of transfers, but, if the inequality continues to hold,
Fht does increase at some point.)
Regarding levels of b¤(fwht) and b¤(gwmt), the following is assumed.
Assumption 2 b¤(fwh((FhFm)hm)) = b¤(fwm((FhFm)hm)) = °b1¡°b(1+r) fwm((FhFm)hm)>eh:
The assumption implies that oﬀspring of high-skill workers can aﬀord advanced education
even when their wage is lowest and thus Fht never decreases. Assume that the initial
distribution of wealth is such that Fh0>0. Then, Fht>0 for any t>0.
As for the dynamics of Fmt, since Fht+1 ¸ Fht is true, if b¤(wlt) > em, Fht+1+Fmt+1 ¸
Fht+Fmt; if b
¤(gwmt)<em; Fht+1=Fht and Fmt+1·Fmt; otherwise, Fht+1+Fmt+1=Fht+Fmt.
Hence, directions of motion of Fht and Fmt can be known from magnitude relations of
b¤(gwmt) to eh and em and of b¤(wlt) to em, except when b¤(gwmt)>eh and b¤(wlt)>em, in which
the direction of motion of Fmt is ambiguous (Fht+1¸Fht and Fht+1+Fmt+1¸Fht+Fmt).
Regarding the value of b¤(wlt), the following is assumed.
Assumption 3 °b
1¡°b(1+r)µAT 2(em; eh):
The assumption states that children of some low-skill workers can aﬀord basic education but
not advanced education when their wage is highest. The two assumptions are maintained
until Section 4.3 where eﬀects of productivity growth are examined.
From these assumptions and Proposition 2, there exist combinations of Fh and Fm satis-
fying b¤(fwm)=eh, those satisfying b¤(fwm)=em, and those satisfying b¤(wl)=em (see Figure
4). b¤(fwm) =eh equals a FhFm 2((FhFm)ml;µ; (FhFm)hm) such that °b1¡°b(1+r) fwm( FhFm )=eh. b¤(fwm) =em
equals a Fh
Fm
< (Fh
Fm
)ml;µ such that
°b
1¡°b(1+r) fwm( FhFm ) = em for Fm < Á(F [h(B);B)F [h(B) and
equals Fh=F
[
h(B) for higher Fm; where F
[
h(B) (a decreasing function) denotes Fh satisfying
°b
1¡°b(1+r) fwm( 1Á(Fh;B))=em. Finally, b¤(wl)=em equals:
23From Assumption 3 below, children of low-skill workers never become accessible to advanced education.
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Figure 4: Dynamics of Fht and Fmt for given B
for Fh
Fm
¸(Fh
Fm
)hm; Fh+Fm=
1¡°b(1+r)
°b
em¡ °B1¡°B (1+r)B
°B
1¡°Bgwm((FhFm)hm)+ 1¡°b(1+r)°b em ; (22)
for Fh
Fm
2
³fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi; (FhFm)hm´ ; °b1¡°b(1+r)P (Fh;Fm;B)AT =em; (23)
and for lower Fh
Fm
, Fh=F
[
h(B): (24)
Figure 4 illustrates the dynamics of Fht and Fmt for given B by placing the three critical
loci on the (Fm; Fh) plane. In the ﬁgure, b
¤(fwm)>(<)eh at the left (right) side of b¤(fwm)=eh
(the bold solid line), b¤(fwm)>(<)em above (below) b¤(fwm)=em (the bold dashed line), and
b¤(wl)> (<)em above (below) b¤(wl) = em (the bold dotted line). Positions of Fht and Fmt
relative to the three loci determine directions of motion of the two variables. In regions with
horizontal arrows only, only Fmt changes: for example, in the region below b
¤(fwm) = em,
b¤(fwm)<em and thus Fmt decreases. Arrows with slope ¡1 are present in the region above
b¤(fwm)=eh and on or below b¤(wl)=em, because b¤(fwm)>eh and b¤(wl)·em and thus Fht
increases with Fht+Fmt constant. In the region above b
¤(wl) = em and b¤(fwm) = eh (thus
b¤(wl)> em and b¤(fwm)> eh) and below Fh+Fm=1, arrows with slope ¡1 and horizontal
arrows are drawn, since Fht and Fht+Fmt increase but the direction of motion of Fmt is
ambiguous (Fht and Fmt move in the direction between the two arrows). Finally, both Fht
16
and Fmt are constant and thus no arrows are present in the region on or below b
¤(fwm)=eh
and b¤(wl)=em and on or above b¤(fwm)=em.
Note that positions of b¤(fwm)= em and b¤(wl)= em as well as those of P (Fh;Fm;B)= µ
and Fm=Á(Fh;B)Fh change with B. Thus, the dynamics of Fht and Fmt must be examined
together with those of Bt. Before examining the joint dynamics, the dynamic equation of
Bt is derived and the direction of motion of Bt for given Fht and Fmt is examined next.
3.2.2 Dynamics of aggregate transfers
The dynamic equation of aggregate transfers is obtained by aggregating the dynamic equa-
tions for individual transfers over the population:
Bt+1=°b ffwhtLht+gwmtLmt+wlt(1¡Lht¡Lmt)+(1+r)Btg ; (25)
where the expression inside the curly bracket is aggregate income net of education costs,
which can be expressed as a function of Fht, Fmt, and Bt.
A.3 of Appendix A analyzes the equation. It is shown that the equation diﬀers depending
on Fht and Fmt, and for given Fht and Fmt, the direction of motion of Bt is determined by
the magnitude relation of Bt to the ﬁxed point: Bt increases (decreases) when it is smaller
(greater) than the value at the ﬁxed point. For later use, notations of the ﬁxed points are:bB¤(Fht+Fmt) when FhtFmt ¸(FhFm)hm; B¤(Fht;Fmt) when FhtFmt 2(minf[Á(Fht;Bt)]¡1;(FhFm)ml;µg; (FhFm)hm),
and B
¤
(Fht) for lower
Fht
Fmt
, all of which are increasing functions.
3.3 Joint dynamics of the aggregate variables
As mentioned earlier, as Bt changes over time, positions of P (Fh;Fm;B)=µ, Fm=Á(Fh;B)Fh,
b¤(fwm) = em, and b¤(wl) = em in Figure 4 change and thus directions of motion of Fht and
Fmt could be aﬀected. Thus, analyzing the joint dynamics are generally diﬃcult.
However, it turns out that under the following weak assumption on B0, characteristics of
the dynamics are mostly determined by relative positions of Fht and Fmt to these loci when
aggregate transfers are at ﬁxed point levels (and relative positions to the remaining loci).
Assumption 4 B0· bB¤(Fh0+Fm0) for Fh0Fm0 ¸(FhFm)hm; B0·B¤(Fh0;Fm0) for Fh0Fm0 2(minf[Á(Fh0;B0)]¡1;
(Fh
Fm
)ml;µg; (FhFm)hm), and B0·B
¤
(Fh0) for lower
Fh0
Fm0
.
The assumption states that the initial level of aggregate transfers is less than the ﬁxed point
level at (Fh;Fm)=(Fh0;Fm0), that is, initial wealth accumulation is not very large.
P (Fh;Fm;B
¤(Fh;Fm))=µ equals, from (16) and (35):
°B
1¡°B¡°b(1+r)
AM(Fh)
®(Fm)
1¡®¡(1+r)(ehFh+emFm)
AT [1¡(Fh+Fm)] =µ: (26)
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As for Fm = Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh))Fh, Lemma A3 of Appendix A shows that Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh)) is de-
creasing in Fh. b
¤(fwm) = em equals a FhFm < (FhFm)ml;µ such that °b1¡°b(1+r) fwm( FhFm ) = em
for Fm < Á(F
[
h;B
¤
(F [h))F
[
h and Fh = F
[
h for higher Fm, where F
[
h denotes Fh satisfying
°b
1¡°b(1+r) fwm( 1Á(Fh;B¤(Fh)))=em. Finally, b¤(wl)=em equals, from (22) and (31):
for Fh
Fm
¸(Fh
Fm
)hm; Fh+Fm=
1¡°b(1+r)
°b
em
°B
1¡°B¡°b(1+r)
gwm((FhFm)hm)+ 1¡°b(1+r)°b em ; (27)
for Fh
Fm
2
³fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi; (FhFm)hm´ ; °b1¡°b(1+r)P (Fh;Fm;B¤(Fh;Fm))AT =em; (28)
and for lower Fh
Fm
, Fh=F
[
h: (29)
Hence, shapes of these loci are similar to the case of constant B and their positions on
the (Fh;Fm) plane can be illustrated by a ﬁgure similar to Figure 4.
4 Main Results
4.1 Characteristics of steady states
First, characteristics of steady states are investigated. The next proposition shows that there
exist four types of steady states. (F yh denotes Fh satisfying [Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh))]
¡1 = (Fh
Fm
)ml;µ.)
Proposition 3 (Steady states) There exist the following four types of steady states.24
1: (Fh;Fm;B) = (1;0; bB¤(1)): Lh and Lm satisfy LhLm =(FhFm)hm and Lh+Lm=1 (Ll=0), P =µ;
and fwh=fwm=fwm((FhFm)hm).
2: Fh = Lh satisﬁes Fh>F
[
h and b
¤(fwm)·eh, Fh1¡Fh ·fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b ehi, and Fm = 1¡Fh.
a: If Fh
1¡Fh · (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ; B = B
¤
(Fh); Lm = maxfÁ(Fh; B¤(Fh));[(FhFm)ml;µ]¡1gFh (Ll = 1¡
Fh¡Lm), P = P (Fh;Lm;B¤(Fh)) < µ for Fh < F yh and P = µ for higher Fh, and fwh =fwh(minf[Á(Fh; B¤(Fh))]¡1;(FhFm)ml;µg)>fwm=wl=PAT .
b: Otherwise; B=B¤(Fh;Fm), Lm=Fm = 1¡Fh, P =µ, and fwh=fwh(FhFm)>fwm=fwm(FhFm).
3: Fh satisﬁes b
¤(wl)· em,Fh·
1¡°b(1+r)
°b
em
°B
1¡°B¡°b(1+r)
gwm((FhFm)hm)+ 1¡°b(1+r)°b em and (Fm;B) = (0;
bB¤(Fh)).
Lh and Lm satisfy
Lh
Lm
=(Fh
Fm
)hm and Lh+Lm = Fh (Ll=1¡Fh); P = °B1¡°B¡°b(1+r)
gwm((FhFm)hm)Fh
AT (1¡Fh) <
µ, and fwh=fwm=fwm((FhFm)hm)>wl=PAT .
4: Fh and Fm satisfy
Fh
Fm
2
hfwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi;fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b ehii and P (Fh;Fm;B¤(Fh;Fm))AT ·
1¡°b(1+r)
°b
em, and B = B
¤(Fh;Fm): Lh = Fh, Lm = Fm; and Ll = 1¡Fh¡Fm, P =
P (Fh;Fm;B
¤(Fh;Fm))<µ; and fwh=fwh(FhFm)>fwm=fwm(FhFm)>wl=PAT .
24Actually, there exists another type of steady states satisfying Fh=F [h, Fm>Á(Fh; B
¤
(Fh))Fh; and B =
B
¤
(Fh), but this cannot be reached out of the steady states and thus is not considered.
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Figure 5: Steady states (Proposition 3)
Figure 5 illustrates four types of steady states, which diﬀer in proportions of the poor
and the very poor, wage inequality, the size of the traditional sector, etc. In Steady state
1, all individuals are non-poor, i.e. they have enough wealth to take advanced education
(Fh = 1), net wages of high-skill and middle-skill workers are equal (fwh = fwm), and the
traditional sector does not exist (thus Ll=0 and P = µ). In Steady state 2, the very poor
do not exist, i.e. everyone can access at least basic education (Fh+Fm=1), but inequality
between high-skill workers and others exists (fwh> fwm). When Fh1¡Fh · (FhFm)ml;µ, net wages of
middle-skill and low-skill workers are equal (fwm=wl), thus some do not take basic education
(Ll>0) and the traditional sector exists. When
Fh
1¡Fh >(
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ; by contrast, everyone takes
at least basic education (Ll = 0), thus only the modern sector exists. In Steady state 3,
there are no poor people (Fm = 0) and fwh = fwm = fwm((FhFm)hm) holds as in Steady state
1, but the very poor do exist (Fh < 1) and become low-skill workers, inequality between
low-skill workers and others is high, and only the traditional sector supplies goods for basic
consumption (thus P <µ). In Steady state 4, both the poor and the very poor exist, there
are inequalities among three types of workers (fwh> fwm>wl), and the traditional sector is
the sole supplier of goods for basic consumption.
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Steady state 1 has features of a typical developed economy: no poverty, low wage in-
equality (wages net of education costs are equal), high relative price of basic consumption,
and no traditional sector (goods for basic consumption are supplied by the modern sector).
Other types of steady states share the contrasting features (except no traditional sector when
Fh
1¡Fh >(
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ of Steady state 2), but diﬀer in characteristics of poverty and wage inequality.
In Steady state 2, extreme poverty does not exist but many cannot access advanced edu-
cation, thus wage inequality between high-skill and other workers is high, while inequality
between middle-skill and low-skill workers is low, features of many middle-income economies.
In Steady state 3, those who can aﬀord basic education can access advanced education as
well, but many cannot aﬀord basic education, hence wage inequality between low-skill work-
ers and others is high, while net wages of high-skill and middle-skill workers are equal and at
the same level as Steady state 1. In Steady state 4, as observed in poorest economies, many
cannot aﬀord basic or advanced education, and typically inequality between middle-skill and
low-skill workers as well as the one between high-skill and middle-skill workers are high.
Proposition A3 of Appendix A examines welfare, output, and sectoral composition of the
steady states. It conﬁrms that Steady state 1 is the best in terms of aggregate net income,
average utility, and aggregate output. Other steady states cannot be ranked deﬁnitely, but
if they are to be ranked, Steady state 2 is the second best, Steady state 3 follows, and Steady
state 4 is the worst. In each type of steady states, the welfare and output measures increase
with the proportion(s) of those accessible to education for jobs with higher net wages, i.e.
Fh in Steady states 2 and 3, and Fh and Fm in Steady state 4 (see Figure 5). Somewhat
consistent with a ﬁnding by La Porta and Shleifer (2008), in Steady states 2 and 4, the
production share of the traditional sector increases with Fh
Fm
when Fh
Fm
is relatively low.25
4.2 Relationship between initial conditions and steady states
From a given initial distribution of wealth, to which type of steady states does the economy
converge in the long run? Proposition A4 of Appendix A analyzes the issue in detail.
Figure 6 presents illustrative trajectories of the dynamics based on the proposition. The
position of (Fh;Fm) = (Fh0;Fm0) relative to b
¤(fwm)= eh essentially determines whether the
economy can converge to Steady state 1 or not. When Fh0
Fm0
·fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b ehi (the region on
or below b¤(fwm)= eh), Steady state 1 cannot be reached except rare possibilities described
in the proposition. Because high-skill workers are scarce relative to middle-skill workers, the
25La Porta and Shleifer (2008) ﬁnd that the diﬀerence in the average share of the informal sector in GDP
between countries in the bottom quartile of the income distribution and those in the second quartile are
very small, and in one measure, the share of the latter group is slightly higher, although the employment
share is much lower.
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Figure 6: Initial conditions and steady states (Proposition A4)
middle-skill wage is not high enough for children of middle-skill workers to access advanced
education, i.e. Fht is constant. If Fh0 and Fm0 are relatively high, the low-skill wage is high
enough that b¤(wl)>em holds initially, descendants of low-skill workers become accessible
to basic education over time, i.e. Fmt increases, and the economy converges to Steady state
2. By contrast, if b¤(wl)· em holds initially, Fmt non-increases (Fmt decreases while FhtFmt is
low enough that b¤(fwm)<em is satisﬁed), and the economy converges to Steady state 4.
When Fh0
Fm0
> fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b ehi, the middle-skill wage is high enough that descendants of
middle-skill workers become accessible to advanced education over time, i.e. Fht increases.
Unless Fh0
Fm0
¸ (Fh
Fm
)hm and b
¤(wl)·em, in which case Fht+Fmt is constant and the ﬁnal state
is Steady state 3, the economy could converge to Steady state 1 through rises in Fht
Fmt
and
Fht (thus inequality between high-skill workers and others falls), although it could converge
to Steady states 2 and 3 too depending on details of the initial distribution. Steady state 1
is more likely to be reached when wages of low-skill and middle-skill wages are high relative
to the high-skill wage, i.e. when Fh0, Fm0, and
Fh0
Fm0
are relatively high.
The result suggests that, for the best long-run outcome to be realized, the initial distri-
bution of wealth must be such that the very poor (those without enough wealth to acquire
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basic skills) are not large in number and the non-poor (those with enough wealth to acquire
advanced skills) must be suﬃcient relative to the poor. Both conditions seem to have held
in a small number of East Asian economies evolving into developed economies, largely be-
cause of successful land redistribution and eﬀective public school system. As in the model
economy converging to Steady state 1, inequality between workers with advanced education
and others fell over time in the course of development in these economies (Wood, 1994).
If the initial size of the very poor is large, i.e. Fh0 + Fm0 is low, which would be true
for poorest economies, the dual structure and large inequality between low-skill workers and
others persist, because good T is cheap and thus low-skill workers with meager earnings
cannot escape from misery (Steady states 3 and 4). If the size of the very poor is not large
but the non-poor are scarce relative to the poor, i.e. Fh0 + Fm0 is not low but
Fh0
Fm0
is low,
which would be the case for typical developing nations with modest growth, low-skill workers
are better-paid, thus the fraction of middle-skill workers and the share of the modern sector
rise and inequality between middle-skill and low-skill workers shrinks over time.26 However,
since children of middle-skill workers have diﬃculty in ”moving up” due to low middle-skill
wage, inequality between high-skill and middle-skill workers worsens over time. And, the lack
of adequate number of high-skill workers typically restrains the growth of the modern sector
and thus the traditional sector continues to supply goods for basic consumption (Steady
state 2). These are what typical developing economies have experienced, as described at the
beginning of the introduction.
The main implication is that, for the full modernization of an economy, the initial dis-
tribution of wealth must be such that extreme poverty is not prevalent so that most people
can acquire basic skills and the size of ”middle class” is enough so that an adequate number
of workers possess advanced skills. Consistent with this and the above results, Hanushek
and Woessmann (2009), using data on international student achievement tests for 50 coun-
tries, ﬁnd that both the share of students with basic skills and that of top performance
have signiﬁcant eﬀects on economic growth that are complementary each other. The model
provides a sectoral-shift-based explanation for their ﬁnding. The model’s implications are
also consistent with ﬁndings by Deininger and Olinto (2000) on relations among inequality,
education, and growth, Easterly (2001) on the importance of middle class in development,
and La Porta and Shleifer (2008) on the importance of educated managers in the expansion
of the modern sector (see footnote 11 in the introduction for details).
In contrast, Galor, Moav, and Vollrath (2009) argue that, land inequality negatively
aﬀects the implementation of public schooling and structural change, whereas capital in-
26To be precise, if the size of the non-poor is very small, i.e. Fh0<F [h, this description does not apply. As
is clear from Figure 6, Fmt falls over time and the long-run state becomes same as the case of low Fh0+Fm0.
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equality among the landless has no eﬀect and greater capital holdings by large landlords
have a positive eﬀect. They develop a model in which human capital is important in manu-
facturing, but not in agriculture, and its accumulation is determined by public expenditure
on education whose level must be agreed by all groups, landowners, capitalists, and work-
ers. While the latter two groups support public schooling, landowners oppose it, unless their
capital wealth becomes large enough. A threshold wealth level for public education increases
with land inequality. They show that the implication that land inequality adversely aﬀects
educational expenditures holds for U.S. state-level data in the period 1880–1940. Hippe
and Baten (2012) also ﬁnd a negative relationship between land inequality and numeracy
development for European regions in the 19th and the ﬁrst decades of the 20th century.
In the present model, distributions of land and capital have similar eﬀects on results,
while they have distinct eﬀects in Galor, Moav, and Vollrath (2009). Further, dimensions of
the distributions important for structural change are diﬀerent: in this model, large shares
in both the bottom and the middle of wealth distribution are critical, whereas, a low share
of land and a large share of capital held by large landowners are important in their model.
If data on both land and capital holdings are available, the diﬀerent implications can be
empirically distinguished. If only data on one of them or combined holdings are available,
the implications could be partially tested by looking at whether eﬀects of the particular
dimensions of the distributions are important, and whether the strength of the eﬀects are
diﬀerent depending on the importance of agriculture in an economy.
4.3 Productivity growth
So far, productivity levels of the two sectors, AM and AT , are assumed to be time-invariant.
In real economy, they change over time, in particular, AM usually grows persistently due to
technological growth. What happens to the dynamics and steady states when AM increases
over time? From the equations for the critical loci in the previous section, an increase in
AM shifts
Fh
Fm
= (Fh
Fm
)hm upward and shifts the remaining loci except Fm = Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh))Fh
(the eﬀect is ambiguous) downward on the (Fm;Fh) plane with relative positions of the loci
unchanged (see Figure 6). Hence, over time, the economy becomes more likely to converge
to Steady state 1 and, as observed in developed nations, the relative number of high-skill
workers to middle-skill workers in the best steady state rises. With the continuous produc-
tivity growth, the economy converges to the best steady state from any initial condition
ultimately, but the speed of convergence depends critically on the initial condition. Hence,
qualitative results of the constant AM case continue to hold approximately.
Another assumption maintained until now is Assumption 2, °b
1¡°b(1+r) fwm((FhFm)hm) > eh,
which states that oﬀspring of high-skill (middle-skill) workers can aﬀord advanced educa-
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Figure 7: Case of low AM , i.e.
°b
1¡°b(1+r) fwm((FhFm)hm)·eh
tion at fwh = fwm; that is, when their wage is lowest (highest). It would apply to contem-
porary economies except those with very bad institutions, but it may not in the past. If
°b
1¡°b(1+r) fwm((FhFm)hm)· eh holds but AM is not extremely low, the phase diagram looks like
Figure 7.27 Unlike Figure 6, b¤(fwh)=eh, not b¤(fwm)=eh; exists below FhFm =(FhFm)hm and above
b¤(fwm)=em. Since Fht decreases above b¤(fwh)=eh; Fh=Fm=1 is not a steady state. There
exist two types of steady states similar to Steady states 2 and 4 of the original economy,
where the convergence to the former type is more likely as Fh0 and Fm0 are higher.
The related assumption on AT is Assumption 3,
°b
1¡°b(1+r)µAT 2(em; eh). The productivity
of the traditional sector is less aﬀected by the advancement of science and technology, but
it also would grow slowly over time in real economy, thus the assumption may not hold far
in the past or in the future. (It may not hold for an economy with very bad land quality
or climate too.) When °b
1¡°b(1+r)µAT · em, children of low-skill workers cannot access basic
education even at P = µ and Fmt non-increases over time. Figure 8 illustrates this case.
Unlike the original economy, b¤(wl) = em does not exist, FhFm = (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ is located below
b¤(fwm) = em, and the dividing locus between P < µ and P = µ (the locus with the broken
line) is located at the lower position on the (Fm;Fh) plane. For given AT ; there exist two
kinds of steady states, one ”combining” Steady states 1 and 3 of the original economy and
27When AM is extremely low, b¤(fwh)= eh is located below b¤(gwm)= em, and the economy converges to
Fh=Fm = 0 from any initial distribution, which is clearly not realistic in modern times.
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Figure 8: Case of low AT, i.e.
°b
1¡°b(1+r)µAT ·em
the other ”combining” Steady states 2 and 4, and if b¤(fwm)>eh at (Fh;Fm)=(Fh0;Fm0); the
economy converges to the ﬁrst type of steady state, otherwise, it converges to the other one.
By contrast, when °b
1¡°b(1+r)µAT > eh; that is, even children of low-skill workers can access
advanced education at P = µ, the result is somewhat similar to the original case, but the
economy is more (less) likely to converge to Steady state 1 (Steady state 2).28
The results can be used to examine the dynamics from the far past when the sectoral
productivities grow over time. As for an economy whose initial AM does not satisfy Assump-
tion 2 but initial AT satisﬁes Assumption 3, the dynamics are illustrated by Figure 7 at ﬁrst
and by Figure 6 after some point.29 If Fh0 and Fm0 are relatively high, at ﬁrst, Fmt; but not
Fht, rises and the inequality between high-skill and middle-skill workers (low-skill workers
too when P =µ) enlarges over time, but after AM becomes high enough for the assumption
to hold, Fht rises, the inequality shrinks, and the economy converges to the best steady state.
The dynamics may resemble historical experiences of many developed economies.
28In this case, FhFm = (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ is located above b¤(gwm) = eh; b¤(wl) = eh exists and is located between
b¤(wl)= em and the dividing locus between P <µ and P = µ; and b¤(wl)= eh and b¤(gwm)= eh intersect on
Fm = Á(Fh; B
¤
(Fh))Fh (see Figure 6). If the initial economy is located above b¤(wl) = eh; it converges to
Steady state 1 for certain, otherwise, the dynamics are qualitatively same as the original economy.
29As mentioned before, the growth of AM shifts FhFm =(
Fh
Fm
)hm and b¤(fwh)=eh upward and the remaining
loci except Fm=Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh))Fh (the eﬀect is ambiguous) downward. The growth of AT ; by contrast, shifts
Fh
Fm
= (FhFm)ml;µ and the dividing locus between P < µ and P = µ upward. If AM grows faster than AT ; a
realistic assumption, the two loci shift downward, so the transition from Figure 7 to Figure 6 takes place.
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4.4 Discussions
The model abstracts from physical capital accumulation and population growth for tractabil-
ity and the focus on education and structural change. This subsection discusses how they
would aﬀect results. The main implication is that the full modernization of an economy
would not be possible while the level of physical capital is low or population growth is rapid.
4.4.1 Role of physical capital accumulation
As noted in footnote 16 of Section 2, the modern sector’s production function can be consid-
ered as a reduced form of the function that includes physical capital as an additional input,
in which case the sector’s productivity AM depends negatively on r. Physical capital is not
considered explicitly since its accumulation does not aﬀect results in a small open economy.
When the capital market is not perfectly open, the accumulation aﬀects human capital
accumulation and structural change. As physical capital is accumulated over time, r falls
and thus AM rises. A rise in AM has positive eﬀects on wages of modern-sector workers and,
when P < µ, the wage of traditional-sector workers. A fall in r also has direct negative eﬀects
on wealth accumulation of many individuals. If the former eﬀects through AM dominate the
latter ones, the dynamics would be similar to the growing AM case analyzed in Section 4.3.
In particular, when the level of physical capital is low, the dynamics would be illustrated
by a diagram similar to the one for the low AM case, Figure 7, where the best steady state
(Fh=Fm=1) does not exist. Because the relative productivity of the modern sector is low,
the sector cannot generate suﬃcient numbers of jobs for educated workers and typically the
traditional sector absorbs uneducated workers. Only after physical capital is accumulated
enough, a phase diagram would look like the original one, Figure 6.
In sum, when the capital market is not perfectly open, physical capital accumulation
plays a critical role in human capital accumulation and structural change. In particular,
the best steady state of no traditional sector and high human capital cannot be realized
unless physical capital is accumulated enough. Relatedly, Galor and Moav (2004, 2006)
develop models in which human capital accumulation starts only after physical capital is
accumulated enough in the course of development.
4.4.2 Role of population growth
As far as economic growth in the very long run, that is, the transition from Malthusian
stagnation to modern economic growth, is concerned, population growth is a crucial factor.
Uniﬁed growth theories (Galor, 2005) model interactions among population growth, human
capital accumulation, and technological change to explain such transition. Although this
paper’s concern is on current situations of developing economies, it would be important to
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see how results are aﬀected by population growth, considering that population growth has
changed over time in modern times (for example, it has been slowing down recently).
As population growth becomes higher, resources parents leave to their children are di-
luted. Such dilution would be captured by a fall in °b in the equation describing intergen-
erational transfers of wealth. With less inherited wealth, less children can aﬀord education.
Thus, b¤(fwm)=eh shifts to the right (b¤(fwm)=em and b¤( ewl)=em shift to the left) in Figure
6, and the best steady state becomes more diﬃcult to be reached. If population growth is
rapid and thus °b is very low, the dynamics could be illustrated by a diagram similar to the
one for the low AM case, Figure 7, where the best steady state does not exist. Hence, the
full modernization of an economy may not be possible while population growth is rapid.
5 Conclusion
This paper has developed a dynamic dual-economy model and examined how the long-
run outcome of the economy depends on the initial distribution of wealth and sectoral
productivity. It is shown that, for fast transformation into a developed economy, the initial
distribution must be such that extreme poverty is not prevalent so that most people can
acquire basic skills and the size of ”middle class” is enough so that an adequate number of
workers possess advanced skills. Both conditions seem to have held in successful East Asian
nations, where, as in the model economy undergoing such transformation, the fraction of
workers with advanced education rose greatly and inequalities between these workers and
others fell over time. In contrast, if the former condition holds but the latter does not, which
would be the case for many nations falling into ”middle income trap”, consistent with facts,
the fraction of workers with basic skills and the share of the modern sector rise, but inequality
between workers with advanced skills and with basic skills worsens and the traditional sector
remains for long periods. If the former condition does not hold, which would be true for
poorest economies, the dual structure and large inequality between workers without basic
skills and others persist for very long periods. Consistently, Hanushek and Woessmann
(2009) ﬁnd that both the share of students with basic skills and that of top performance
have signiﬁcant eﬀects on economic growth that are complementary each other.
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Appendix A: Supplementary analysis
A.1 Critical equations determining educational choices and wages
This section examines critical equations determining educational choices and wages, in par-
ticular, Fh and Fm satisfying fwm( FhFm )=P (Fh;Fm;B)AT , Fm=Á(Fh;B)Fh and P (Fh;Fm;B)=
µ. Remember that (Fh
Fm
)hm is
Fh
Fm
satisfying fwh( FhFm ) = fwm( FhFm ), which exists and is unique
since fwh (fwm) decreases (increases) with FhFm and fwh > (<)fwm at FhFm = 0(=+1) from (12)
and (13), and (Fh
Fm
)ml;µ is
Fh
Fm
satisfying fwm( FhFm )=µAT (wl when P =µ).
Lemma A1 shows the existence of Fh and Fm satisfying fwm( FhFm )=P (Fh;Fm;B)AT when
°B
1¡°B (1+r)B<µAT and describes its shape and its relation with (
Fh
Fm
)hm and (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ. (When
°B
1¡°B (1+r)B¸µAT ; P (Fh;Fm;B)>µ from (16) and thus P =µ:)
Lemma A1 Suppose °B
1¡°B (1+r)B < µAT . Then, positive Fh and Fm satisfying fwm( FhFm ) =
P (Fh;Fm;B)AT exists and is expressed as Fm = Á(Fh;B)Fh, where Á(¢) is a function satis-
fying limFh!0 Á(Fh;B) = Á(B) ´
·
(1¡®)AM
(1+r)(
°B
1¡°B B+em)¸
1
®
. When Fh
Fm
· (Fh
Fm
)hm, Á(¢) is a decreas-
ing function of its arguments, and, for given B, there exists a unique Fh > 0 satisfying
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Figure 9: Lemma A1
[Á(Fh;B)]
¡1=(Fh
Fm
)hm, denoted F
z
h(B), and the one satisfying [Á(Fh;B)]
¡1=(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ, denoted
F yh(B), where F
z
h(¢) and F yh(¢) are decreasing functions and F zh(B)>F yh(B).
Figure 9 illustrates Fm=Á(Fh;B)Fh (fwm( FhFm )=P (Fh;Fm;B)AT ), FhFm =(FhFm)hm, and FhFm =
(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ on the (Fm; Fh) plane. F
z
h(B) and F
y
h(B) are unique intersections of Fm=Á(Fh;B)Fh
with Fh
Fm
=(Fh
Fm
)hm and
Fh
Fm
=(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ, respectively. As Fh ! 0; Fm satisfying Fm=Á(Fh;B)Fh
approaches 0 (since limFh!0 Á(Fh;B)=Á(B) <1). FhFm = 1Á(Fh;B) increases with Fh, thus Fm
increases with Fh on the curve for low
Fh
Fm
, but the relationship turns negative for high Fh
Fm
.
As B increases, Á(Fh;B) decreases, thus the curve shifts leftward and F
z
h(B) and F
y
h(B) fall.
Lemma A2 describes the shape of P (Fh;Fm;B)=µ and its relation with Fm=Á(Fh;B)Fh.
Lemma A2 Suppose °B
1¡°B (1+r)B<µAT . When
Fh
Fm
2 [[Á(0)]¡1;(Fh
Fm
)hm] ([Á(0)]
¡1 is the small-
est Fh
Fm
satisfying Fm=Á(Fh;0)Fh), P (Fh;Fm;B) is an increasing function of its arguments.
Given B, for any Fh
Fm
2 [[Á(0)]¡1;(Fh
Fm
)hm], Fh and Fm satisfying P (Fh;Fm;B)=µ exist and are
unique, and for Fh
Fm
>(<)(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ, Fm<(>)Á(Fh;B)Fh when P (Fh;Fm;B)=µ.
A.2 Eﬀects of Fh, Fm; and B on welfare, output, and sectoral
composition
This section examines eﬀects of Fh, Fm; and B on aggregate income net of education costs
(NI ´ fwhLh+ fwmLm+wl(1¡Lh¡Lm)+(1+ r)B), average utility, aggregate output (Y =
YM+PYT ), the share of the modern sector in production (
YM
Y
), and the sector’s share in
basic consumption when P = µ (CBM
PCB
), where CBM denotes the amount of good M used for
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basic consumption. Proofs of the following two propositions are provided in Appendix D
posted on the author’s website (http://www.econ.kyoto-u.ac.jp/˜yuki/english.html).
Proposition A1 (Net aggregate income and average utility) Suppose Fh>0.
(i) If Fh
Fm
¸(Fh
Fm
)hm, NI and average utility increase with Fh+Fm and B.
(ii) Otherwise,
(a) If Fh
Fm
2((Fh
Fm
)ml;µ;(
Fh
Fm
)hm), they increase with Fh; Fm; and B.
(b) If Fh
Fm
·(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ,
1:When °B
1¡°B (1+r)B<µAT and Fh<F
y
h(B), if Fm¸Á(Fh;B)Fh, they increase with Fh
and B; otherwise, same as (a).
2: Or else, they increase with Fh and B.
Both net aggregate income and average utility increase with B and the proportion(s) of
individuals accessible to education for jobs with higher net wages, i.e. Fh+Fm when fwh=fwm,
Fh and Fm when fwh> fwm>wl, and Fh when fwm=wl. As for NI and average utility when
P =µ, this is because the negative eﬀect through fwh or fwm (except when fwh=fwm>wl=µAT
or fwh> fwm=wl= µAT ) is dominated by positive eﬀects through other wages (except whenfwh= fwm>wl = µAT ), proportions of workers with higher net wages, and B. When P < µ,
increases in these variables raise P and thus have a negative eﬀect on average utility, but
the positive eﬀect through net aggregate income dominates.
Proposition A2 (Aggregate output and sectoral composition) Suppose Fh>0.
(i)When Fh
Fm
¸(Fh
Fm
)hm, if Fh+Fm<
(1¡°B)µAT¡°B(1+r)Bh
°Bgwm((FhFm)hm)+(1¡°B)µAT i , Y increases with Fh+Fm and B;
and YM
Y
increases with Fh+Fm
B
; otherwise, they increase with Fh+Fm; and
CBM
PCB
increases
with Fh+Fm and B.
(ii)When Fh
Fm
<(Fh
Fm
)hm,
(a) If Fh
Fm
2((Fh
Fm
)ml;µ;(
Fh
Fm
)hm), when P (Fh;Fm;B)·µ (possible only when °B1¡°B (1+r)B<µAT ),
Y increases with Fh; Fm; and B; and
YM
Y
increases with Fh and Fm and decreases with
B; otherwise, they increase with Fh and Fm; and
CBM
PCB
increases with Fh; Fm; and B.
(b) If Fh
Fm
·(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ,
1:When °B
1¡°B (1+r)B < µAT and Fh <F
y
h(B), if Fm ¸ Á(Fh;B)Fh, Y increases with Fh
and B; and YM
Y
decreases with B (depends on Fh too); otherwise, same as (a) when
P (Fh;Fm;B)·µ.
2: Or else, Y and YM
Y
increase with Fh; and
CBM
PCB
increases with Fh and B.
When P < µ, aggregate output increases with B and the proportion(s) of individuals
accessible to education for jobs with higher net wages, as NI and average utility do. In the
case of Fm<Á(Fh;B)Fh, this is because the increased proportion(s) raises Lh and Lm and
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shifts production to the more productive modern sector (an increase in YM is greater than
a decrease in YT ), plus they and B increase NI, thereby raising the demand for good T and
thus P .30 The modern sector’s share in production increases with the proportion(s) (except
the case Fm¸Á(Fh;B)Fh of (b) 1, where the eﬀect is ambiguous) but decreases with B.
When P =µ, by contrast, P does not depend on NI and thus Y and YM
Y
are independent
of B (and increase with the proportion(s)). The modern sector too produces goods for basic
consumption, i.e. CBM > 0, in this case. The proportion of basic consumption supplied by
the sector increases with B as well as the proportion(s), because CBM
PCB
= PCB¡PYT
PCB
=1¡ µYT
°BNI
and thus it increases with NI and decreases with YT =AT (1¡Lh¡Lm).
A.3 The dynamic equation of Bt and its ﬁxed point
This section examines the dynamic equation of Bt; (25), of Section 3.2 and its ﬁxed point.
When Fht
Fmt
¸(Fh
Fm
)hm, if Fht+Fmt<
(1¡°B)µAT¡°B(1+r)Bt
°Bgwm((FhFm)hm)+(1¡°B)µAT and thus Pt<µ, the equation is:
Bt+1=
°b
1¡°B ffwm((FhFm)hm)(Fht+Fmt)+(1+r)Btg: (30)
°b
1¡°B (1+r)<1 is assumed so that the ﬁxed point for given Fht+Fmt exists, which equals:bB¤(Fht+Fmt)= °b
1¡°B¡°b(1+r)fwm((FhFm)hm)(Fht+Fmt): (31)
Clearly, when Bt<(>) bB¤(Fht+Fmt), Bt+1>(<)Bt. If Fht+Fmt¸ (1¡°B)µAT¡°B(1+r)Bt
°Bgwm((FhFm)hm)+(1¡°B)µAT and
thus Pt=µ, the dynamic equation and its ﬁxed point equal:
Bt+1=°bffwm((FhFm)hm)(Fht+Fmt)+µAT [1¡(Fht+Fmt)]+(1+r)Btg; (32)bB¤(Fht+Fmt)= °b
1¡°b(1+r)ffwm((FhFm)hm)(Fht+Fmt)+µAT [1¡(Fht+Fmt)]g; (33)
where bB¤(Fht+Fmt) is an increasing function.
When Fht
Fmt
2((Fh
Fm
)ml;µ;(
Fh
Fm
)hm), if Pt=P (Fht;Fmt;Bt)·µ, they equal:
Bt+1=
°b
1¡°B f[AM(Fht)
®(Fmt)
1¡®¡(1+r)(ehFht+emFmt)]+(1+r)Btg; (34)
B¤(Fht;Fmt)=
°b
1¡°B¡°b(1+r)fAM(Fht)
®(Fmt)
1¡®¡(1+r)(ehFht+emFmt)g; (35)
where B¤(Fht;Fmt) is an increasing function. If P (Fht;Fmt;Bt)>µ (thus Pt=µ), they are:
Bt+1=°bfAM(Fht)®(Fmt)1¡®¡(1+r)(ehFht+emFmt)+µAT (1¡Fht¡Fmt)+(1+r)Btg; (36)
B¤(Fht;Fmt)=
°b
1¡°b(1+r)fAM(Fht)
®(Fmt)
1¡®¡(1+r)(ehFht+emFmt)+µAT (1¡Fht¡Fmt)g; (37)
where B¤(Fht;Fmt) is an increasing function since fwht>gwmt>wlt=µAT .
30In the case Fm¸Á(Fh;B)Fh of (b) 1, the eﬀect of Fh on YM is ambiguous and that of B is negative, but
their eﬀects on PYT are positive and dominate.
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When Fht
Fmt
· (Fh
Fm
)ml;µ,
°B
1¡°B (1+r)Bt < µAT , and Fht < F
y
h(Bt), if Fmt < Á(Fht;Bt)Fht, the
equations are (34) and (35) above. If Fmt¸Á(Fht;Bt)Fht, the dynamic equation is:
Bt+1=
°b
1¡°B
©£
AM(Á(Fht;Bt))
1¡®¡(1+r)(eh+Á(Fht;Bt)em)
¤
Fht+(1+r)Bt
ª
: (38)
The next lemma shows that, given Fht, Bt converges monotonically to the unique ﬁxed
point of (38), B
¤
(Fht), and B
¤
(Fht) increases and Á(Fht;B
¤
(Fht)) decreases with Fht.
Lemma A3When the dynamics of Bt follow (38); given Fht, Bt converges monotonically
to unique B
¤
(Fht), which is a solution to
B
¤
(Fht)=
°b
1¡°B¡°b(1+r)fAM(Á(Fht;B
¤
(Fht)))
1¡®¡(1+r)(eh+Á(Fht;B¤(Fht))em)Fhtg; (39)
and when Bt<(>)B
¤
(Fht), Bt+1>(<)Bt. B
¤
(Fht) is increasing and Á(Fht;B
¤
(Fht)) is decreas-
ing in Fht and limFht!0 Á(Fht;B
¤
(Fht))=Á(0)´ limFht!0 Á(Fht;0).
When Fht
Fmt
·(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ and either
°B
1¡°B (1+r)Bt<µAT and Fht¸F
y
h(Bt) or
°B
1¡°B (1+r)Bt¸µAT ,
Bt+1=°bffwh((FhFm)ml;µ)Fht+µAT (1¡Fht)+(1+r)Btg; (40)
B
¤
(Fht)=
°b
1¡°b(1+r)ffwh((FhFm)ml;µ)Fht+µAT (1¡Fht)g; (41)
where B
¤
(Fht) is an increasing function.
A.4 Welfare, output, and sectoral composition in steady states
The next proposition examines the steady states in terms of welfare, output, and sectoral
composition, based on Propositions A1 and A2 and Proposition 3 of Section 4.1.
Proposition A3 (Welfare, output, and sectoral composition in steady states)
(i) Aggregate net income and average utility are highest in Steady state 1. They increase with
Fh in Steady states 2 and 3, and with Fh and Fm in Steady state 4. Their maxima in
Steady states 2 and 3 are strictly higher than the ones in Steady state 4, and the inﬁnima
in Steady state 2 are strictly higher than the ones in Steady states 3 and 4.
(ii) The same result as (i) holds for aggregate output; except that the magnitude relation
of the maxima in Steady states 3 and 4 is unclear. In Steady state 1, YM
Y
= CBM
PCB
= 1.
In Steady state 2, if Fh < F
y
h,
YM
Y
increases (decreases) with Fh
Fm
= [Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh))]
¡1 for
[Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh))]
¡1 >(<) ®
1¡®
em
eh
, where ®
1¡®
em
eh
> fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi ; if Fh ¸ F yh and Fh1¡Fh ·
(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ,
YM
Y
and CBM
PCB
increase with Fh; otherwise,
YM
Y
= CBM
PCB
=1. In Steady state 3, YM
Y
is constant. In Steady state 4, YM
Y
increases (decreases) with Fh
Fm
for Fh
Fm
>(<) ®
1¡®
em
eh
:31
The proposition proves that Steady state 1 is the best in terms of aggregate net income,
average utility, and aggregate output. Other steady states cannot be ranked deﬁnitely, but
31CBM = 0 in the case Fh<F
y
h of Steady state 2 and in Steady states 3 and 4.
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if they are to be ranked, Steady state 2 is the second best, Steady state 3 follows, and Steady
state 4 is the worst: the maximum values of these variables in Steady states 2 and 3 (except
aggregate output in Steady state 3) are strictly higher than the ones in Steady state 4, and
the inﬁnima in Steady state 2 are strictly higher than the ones in Steady states 3 and 4.
The three variables increase with the proportion(s) of those accessible to education for jobs
with higher net wages, i.e. Fh in Steady states 2 and 3, and Fh and Fm in Steady state 4.
As for shares of the modern sector in production and in basic consumption, when P <µ
(thus CBM
PCB
= 0), YM
Y
depends on Fh
Fm
and the relation can be non-monotonic: in the case
Fh < F
y
h of Steady state 2 and in Steady state 4,
YM
Y
decreases with Fh
Fm
for Fh
Fm
< ®
1¡®
em
eh
(note ®
1¡®
em
eh
> fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi) and the relation turns positive for FhFm > ®1¡® emeh if ®1¡® emeh <fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b ehi: That is, the production share decreases with FhFm when FhFm is relatively low.
By contrast, when P = µ; i.e. in the case Fh¸F yh and Fh1¡Fh · (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ of Steady state 2,
YM
Y
and CBM
PCB
increase with Fh. (They equal 1 in Steady state 1 and in the case
Fh
1¡Fh > (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ
of Steady state 2; YM
Y
(<1) is constant and CBM
PCB
=0 in Steady state 3.)
A.5 Relationship between initial conditions and steady states
The next proposition presents the relationship between initial conditions and steady states.
Since the lengthy analysis of the dynamics is involved, the proof is provided in Appendix C
posted on the author’s website (http://www.econ.kyoto-u.ac.jp/˜yuki/english.html).
Proposition A4 (Initial conditions and steady states)
(i)When Fh0
Fm0
<fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi
a: If Fh0<F
[
h; Fht is constant, Fmt falls, and the economy most likely converges to Steady
state 4.32
b: If Fh0¸F [h; when Fh0¸F [h(B0), Fht is constant, Fmt increases, and the economy converges
to Steady state 2.33 When Fh0<F
[
h(B0), at ﬁrst, Fht is constant and Fmt decreases, and
it could converge to any type of steady states or cycle.34
(ii)When Fh0
Fm0
2
hfwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi;fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b ehii
a: If b¤(wl)· em at (Fh;Fm;B) = (Fh0;Fm0;B¤(Fh0;Fm0)), Fht and Fmt are constant and the
ﬁnal state is Steady state 4.
b: Otherwise, Fht is constant, Fmt rises, and the economy converges to Steady state 2.
32 Fmt could ”jump over” the region FhFm 2
hgwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi;gwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b ehiidepending on the initial
distribution, in which case it converges to another type of steady states, particularly Steady state 3.
33The exception is when Fh0=F [h and B0=B
¤
(Fh0), in which case both Fmt and Bt are constant.
34The economy possibly cycles between the region FhFm <gwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi and Fh 2 [F [h; F [h(B)) and the
region FhFm 2
hgwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi ;gwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b ehii.
34
(iii)When Fh0
Fm0
>fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b ehi ; Fht increases and Fht+Fmt non-decreases at ﬁrst.
a: If Fh0
Fm0
¸(Fh
Fm
)hm and b
¤(wl)·em at (Fh;Fm) = (Fh0;Fm0) and B = bB¤(Fh0+Fm0), Fht+Fmt
is constant and the economy converges to Steady state 3.
b: If Fh0
Fm0
< (Fh
Fm
)hm and b
¤(wl) · em at (Fh;Fm) = (Fh0;Fm0) and B = B¤(Fh0;Fm0), the
following three scenarios are possible depending on details of the initial distribution.
1: The more likely is the same scenario as a:
2: Fht+Fmt rises from the start or after some period and the ﬁnal state is Steady state 1.
3: After Fht+Fmt increases for a while, Fht becomes constant, Fmt increases, and the
economy converges to Steady state 2.
The ﬁrst scenario is more likely as Fh0 and Fm0 are lower, and the second one is more
likely than the third one as Fh0
Fm0
is higher.
c: Otherwise, the same scenarios as 2: and 3: of b: are possible.
Appendix B: Proofs of lemmas and propositions
Proof of Lemma A1. (Existence of function Á(¢)) Let Á= Fm
Fh
. Then, from (13) and (16),fwm( FhFm )=P (Fh;Fm;B)AT is expressed as:
(1¡®)AM(Á)¡®¡(1+r)em= °B
1¡°B
AM(Á)
1¡®Fh+(1+r)[B¡(eh+Áem)Fh]
1¡(1+Á)Fh ; (42)
where Fh<
1
1+Á
, Á< 1¡Fh
Fh
must be true. When Fh!0, the equation becomes:
(1¡®)AM(Á)¡®¡(1+r)em= °B
1¡°B (1+r)B; (43)
whose solution Á=Á(B) ´ [ (1¡®)AM
(1+r)(
°B
1¡°B B+em)
]
1
® satisﬁes Á(B)·Á´Á(0)= [ (1¡®)AM
(1+r)em
]
1
® , where
Á is the solution to fwm=(1¡®)AM(Á)¡®¡(1+r)em=0. The LHS of (42) decreases and the
RHS increases with Á for Á<minf1¡Fh
Fh
; Ág; as Á! 0, LHS!+1 and thus LHS >RHS;
and as Á!minf1¡Fh
Fh
; Ág, LHS<RHS since, at Á=Á< 1¡Fh
Fh
, LHS=0 and RHS>0 (from
Á > [(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ]
¡1 > [(Fh
Fm
)hm]
¡1, fwh > fwm = 0 and AM(Á)1¡®¡(1+r)(eh+Áem) =fwh+Áfwm > 0),
and when 1¡Fh
Fh
·Á, RHS!+1 as Á! 1¡Fh
Fh
. Hence, for given Fh > 0 and B, a unique Á2
(0;minf1¡Fh
Fh
; Ág) satisfying (42), denoted Á=Á(Fh; B), exists, and limFh!0 Á(Fh;B)=Á(B).
(Properties of Á(¢)) The RHS of (42) is strictly increasing in Fh (< 11+Á) when Á 2
[[(Fh
Fm
)hm]
¡1;minf1¡Fh
Fh
; Ág), because AM(Á)1¡®¡(1+r)(eh+Áem)=fwh+Áfwm> (1+Á)µAT >0 at
Á=[(Fh
Fm
)hm]
¡1 from Assumption 1. Thus, Á(Fh;B) is a decreasing function. Á(B)> [(FhFm)hm]
¡1
because fwm > µAT at Á = [(FhFm)hm]¡1 from Assumption 1 and fwm = °B1¡°B (1+r)B < µAT at
Á = Á(B) from (43). Then, since limFh!0 Á(Fh;B) = Á(B) > [(
Fh
Fm
)hm]
¡1 and the limit of
Á(Fh;B) when Fh! 1
1+[(
Fh
Fm
)hm]¡1
is strictly less than [(Fh
Fm
)hm]
¡1 (from eq. 42), for given B,
there exists a unique Fh > 0 satisfying Á(Fh;B)=[(
Fh
Fm
)hm]
¡1, which is denoted as F zh(B). The
existence of F yh(B) can be proved similarly. F
z
h(B)>F
y
h(B) is from Assumption 1.
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Proof of Lemma A2. From the proof of Lemma A1, Á(0)¸Á(B)> [(Fh
Fm
)hm]
¡1, fwm¸ (>)0
for Fh
Fm
¸ (>)[Á(0)]¡1, and fwh¸ fwm for FhFm · (FhFm)hm from the deﬁnition of (FhFm)hm. Thus, the
numerator of (16) and P (Fh;Fm;B) increase with Fh and Fm for
Fh
Fm
2 [[Á(0)]¡1;(Fh
Fm
)hm].
From (16) and Á= Fm
Fh
, P (Fh;Fm;B)=µ is expressed as:
1
AT
°B
1¡°B
AM(Á)
1¡®Fh+(1+r)[B¡(eh+Áem)Fh]
1¡(1+Á)Fh =µ; (44)
where Fh <
1
1+Á
. For given Á 2 [[(Fh
Fm
)hm]
¡1;Á(0)], LHS = 1
AT
°B
1¡°B (1+r)B < µ when Fh = 0;
LHS!+1 when Fh! 11+Á ; and the LHS increases with Fh (AM(Á)1¡®¡(1+r)(eh+Áem)=fwh+Áfwm > 0). Hence, given B, for any FhFm 2 [[Á(0)]¡1;(FhFm)hm], there exists a unique Fh 2
(0; 1
1+[
Fh
Fm
]¡1
) satisfying P (Fh;Fh;B)=µ. When
Fh
Fm
> (<)(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ and thus fwm( FhFm )> (<)µAT ,
at P (Fh;Fm;B)=µ; fwm( FhFm )>(<)µAT =P (Fh;Fm;B)AT , that is, Fm<(>)Á(Fh;B)Fh.
Proof of Proposition 1. Since Fh>0, an equilibrium with Lh, Lm>0 always exists from
the shape of the production functions. Thus, equilibrium Lh and Lm must satisfy fwh¸ fwm
(thus Lh
Lm
·(Fh
Fm
)hm) and fwm¸wl. Since fwh=fwm>µAT ¸wl at LhLm =(FhFm)hm (from Assumption
1) and fwh(fwm) decreases (increases) with LhLm , equilibrium LhLm satisfying fwh= fwm=wl does
not exist. Hence, when fwh= fwm, fwm>wl, and when fwm=wl, fwh> fwm. In the former case,
Lh·Fh, Lh+Lm=Fh+Fm, and LhLm · FhFm , and in the latter, Lh=Fh, Lm·Fm, and LhLm ¸ FhFm .
(i) fwm = wl is not possible since fwh > fwm and LhLm = FhLm ¸ FhFm ¸ (FhFm)hm cannot hold
together. Thus, fwm>wl, Lh+Lm=Fh+Fm and LhLm = LhFh+Fm¡Lh · FhFm . When FhFm =(FhFm)hm,fwh> fwm with Lh<Fh (since LhLm < FhFm = (FhFm)hm) and thus Lh=Fh, Lm=Fm, and fwh= fwm
in equilibrium. When Fh
Fm
> (Fh
Fm
)hm, fwh< fwm with Lh=Fh and thus Lh<Fh and fwh= fwm in
equilibrium. Values of Lh and Lm are obtained from
Lh
Lm
=(Fh
Fm
)hm and Lh+Lm=Fh+Fm.
(ii) If fwh=fwm, as shown above, LhLm = LhFh+Fm¡Lh · FhFmmust hold, which implies LhLm · FhFm <
(Fh
Fm
)hm and thus fwh>fwm, a contradiction. Hence, fwh>fwm and Lh=Fh in equilibrium.
When °B
1¡°B (1+r)B¸µAT , the RHS of (16) is greater than µ for any equilibrium Lh and Lm
(since ewi>0), thus P =µ and wl=µAT in equilibrium. Hence, when FhFm 2 ((FhFm)ml;µ;(FhFm)hm),fwm>wl and Lm=Fm, and when FhFm ·(FhFm)ml;µ, fwm=wl and LhLm = FhLm =(FhFm)ml;µ.
When °B
1¡°B (1+r)B < µAT , since
Fh
Fm
< (Fh
Fm
)hm, from Lemma A1, Fh and Fm satisfyingfwm( FhFm )=P (Fh;Fm;B)AT exist for any FhFm ¸ [Á(B)]¡1 and is expressed as Fm=Á(Fh;B)Fh,
where Á(¢) is a decreasing function, and from Lemma A2, Fh and Fm satisfying P (Fh;Fm;B)=
µ exist for any Fh
Fm
¸ [Á(0)]¡1, where P (¢) is an increasing function. Note that (Fh
Fm
)ml;µ >
[Á(B)]¡1¸ [Á(0)]¡1 from (42) and (43) in the proof of Lemma A1 and °B
1¡°B (1+r)B<µAT .
(a) When P (Fh;Fm;B)<µ, fwm( FhFm )>µAT >P (Fh;Fm;B)AT from FhFm > (FhFm)ml;µ. Hence,
Lm = Fm and fwm > µAT > wl = P (Fh;Fm;B)AT in equilibrium. When P (Fh;Fm;B) ¸ µ,fwm = fwm( FhLm ) = P (Fh;Lm;B)AT = wl ¸ fwm( FhFm ) cannot be true since fwm( FhFm ) > µAT from
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Fh
Fm
>(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ. Hence, fwm>wl, Lm=Fm, and P =µ in equilibrium.
(b) 1. From Lemma A1 (see Figure 9 too), for any Fh
Fm
2 [ [Á(B)]¡1;(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ), there exists
Fh < F
y
h(B) satisfying Fm = Á(Fh;B)Fh. When P (Fh;Fm;B) ¸ µ (then, Fm > Á(Fh;B)Fh
from Lemma A2) or when P (Fh;Fm;B)<µ and Fm¸Á(Fh;B)Fh, fwm( FhFm )·P (Fh;Fm;B)AT
and thus fwm = fwm( FhLm ) = P (Fh;Lm;B)AT =wl and Lm = Á(Fh;B)Fh in equilibrium, wherefwm = fwm( FhLm )< µAT from FhLm = 1Á(Fh;B) < 1Á(F yh(B);B) = (FhFm)ml;µ. When P (Fh;Fm;B)< µ and
Fm<Á(Fh;B)Fh, fwm=fwm( FhFm )>P (Fh;Fm;B)AT =wl and Lm=Fm in equilibrium.
2. When Fh
Fm
·(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ and Fh¸F yh(B), from Lemma A2 (see Figure 1 too), P (Fh;Fm;B)=
P (Fh;[
Fh
Fm
]¡1Fh;B) ¸ P (Fh;[(FhFm)ml;µ]¡1Fh;B) ¸ P (F
y
h(B);[(
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ]
¡1F yh(B);B) = µ. From
Lemma A2, when P (Fh;Fm;B)¸µ, Fm¸Á(Fh;B)Fh and thus fwm( FhFm )·µAT ·P (Fh;Fm;B)AT .
Hence, fwm= µAT =wl, P = µ, Lm=[(FhFm)ml;µ]¡1Fh, and fwh=fwh([(FhFm)ml;µ]¡1) in equilibrium.
Note that fwm=wl=P (Fh;Lm;B)AT <µAT (thus LhLm = FhLm >(FhFm)ml;µ) is not possible because,
from Lemma A2, if Fh
Lm
>(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ, fwm( FhLm )>P (Fh;Lm;B)AT when P (Fh;Lm;B)<µ.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) From Proposition 1 (i), Lh
Lm
= (Fh
Fm
)hm and thus fwh = fwm =fwm((FhFm)hm), which is strictly greater than µAT (thus wl) from Assumption 1. By substitutingfwh=fwm=fwm((FhFm)hm) and Lh+Lm=Fh+Fm into P (eq. 15) and equating it with µ,
°B
1¡°B
fwm((FhFm)hm)(Fh+Fm)+(1+r)B
1¡(Fh+Fm) =µAT , Fh+Fm=
(1¡°B)µAT¡°B(1+r)B
°Bfwm((FhFm)hm)+(1¡°B)µAT : (45)
Thus, the result for wl holds. (ii) Straightforward from proofs of Proposition 1 (ii).
Proof of Lemma A3. From the proof of Lemma A2, Á=Á(Fht;Bt) is a solution to
(1¡®)AM(Á)¡®¡(1+r)em= °B
1¡°B
[AM(Á)
1¡®¡(1+r)(eh+Áem)]Fht+(1+r)Bt
1¡(1+Á)Fht . (46)
where the ﬁrst term of the numerator of the RHS equals fwht+Ágwmt > 0 from (12) and
(13). Since the LHS decreases with Á and the RHS and its denominator increase with Á, its
numerator increases with Bt. Thus, the numerator of the RHS of (38) is positive at Bt=0
and is increasing in Bt. Further, for any Bt>0,
@RHS
@Bt
= °b
1¡°B
n£
(1¡®)AM(Á(Fht;Bt))¡®¡(1+r)em
¤
Fht
@Á(Fht;Bt)
@Bt
+(1+r)
o
< °b(1+r)
1¡°B <1: (47)
Hence, for given Fht, Bt converges monotonically to the unique solution to (39), B
¤
(Fht), and
when Bt<(>)B
¤
(Fht), Bt+1>(<)Bt. From (46) and (39), Á=Á(Fht;B
¤
(Fht)) is a solution to:
(1¡®)AM(Á)¡®¡(1+r)em= °B
1¡°B¡°b(1+r)
AM(Á)
1¡®¡(1+r)(eh+Áem)
1¡(1+Á)Fht Fht: (48)
Thus, Á(Fht;B
¤
(Fht)) is decreasing in Fht and, as Fht!0, Á(Fht;B¤(Fht))!Á(0)´ [ (1¡®)AM(1+r)em ]
1
® .
Finally, dB
¤
(Fht)
dFht
>0 is from (25) and Proposition A1 (ii)(b) 1.
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Proof of Proposition 3. In a steady state, relative positions of the critical loci determining
the dynamics of Fh and Fm and the magnitude relation of P and µ are illustrated by Figure
5. In the region satisfying b¤(fwm) > eh and b¤(wl) > em of the ﬁgure, Fh and Fh+Fm
increase when Fh < 1, thus Fh < 1 cannot be a steady state. Hence, (Fh;Fm) = (1;0) is
the only steady state (Steady state 1). Since Fh
Fm
= +1 > (Fh
Fm
)hm and P = µ from the
ﬁgure, B = bB¤(1) holds from (33). In the region satisfying b¤(fwm)· eh and b¤(wl)> em,
Fh is constant and Fm increases when Fh+Fm< 1, thus steady states are such that Fm =
1¡Fh and Fh satisﬁes b¤(fwm) · eh , FhFm = Fh1¡Fh · fwm¡1[1¡°b(1+r)°b eh] (from the paragraph
just after Assumption 3) and b¤(wl)> em, Fh >F [h (from eq. 29) [Steady state 2]. Since
Lm = maxfÁ(Fh; B¤(Fh));[(FhFm)ml;µ]¡1gFh when FhFm = Fh1¡Fh · (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ and Lm = Fm when
Fh
1¡Fh > (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ from Proposition 1, B = B
¤
(Fh) when
Fh
1¡Fh · (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ from (39) and (41),
and B = B¤(Fh;Fm) when Fh1¡Fh > (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ from P = µ and (37). In the region satisfying
b¤(fwm)>eh and b¤(wl)·em, Fh increases and Fm decreases when Fm>0, thus steady states
are such that Fm = 0 and Fh satisﬁes b
¤(wl) · em , Fh ·
1¡°b(1+r)
°b
em
°B
1¡°B¡°b(1+r)
gwm((FhFm)hm)+ 1¡°b(1+r)°b em
(from eq. 27) [Steady state 3]. Since P < µ from the ﬁgure, B = bB¤(Fh) holds from (31).
In the region satisfying b¤(fwm)· eh and b¤(wl)· em, Fh is constant and Fm decreases (is
constant) when b¤(fwm)<(¸)em, thus steady states are: Fh and Fm satisfying em·b¤(fwm)·
eh, FhFm 2
hfwm¡1[1¡°b(1+r)°b em];fwm¡1[1¡°b(1+r)°b eh]i and b¤(wl)·em,P (Fh;Fm;B¤(Fh;Fm))AT ·
1¡°b(1+r)
°b
em (from eq. 28), and B = B
¤(Fh;Fm) (from eq. 35) [Steady state 4]; and Fh=F [h;
Fm¸Á(F [h;B
¤
(F [h))F
[
h (thus
Fh
Fm
<fwm¡1[1¡°b(1+r)°b em]); and B=B¤(Fh) (see footnote 24).
In Steady state 2, from the ﬁgure and the result on B, P =P (Fh;Lm;B
¤
(Fh))<µ if Fh·F yh
and P =µ otherwise. In Steady state 3, P =P (Lh;Lm; bB¤(Fh))= °B1¡°B¡°b(1+r) gwm((FhFm)hm)FhAT (1¡Fh) from
(16), (31), and fwh = fwm = fwm((FhFm)hm). Levels of Lh, Lm, and Ll; and wages are from
Propositions 1 and 2 and the result on P .
Proof of Proposition A3. (i) From Proposition A1 (i), aggregate net income (NI) and
average utility of Steady state (SS) 1 are strictly greater than those of SS 3, and they increase
with Fh in SS 3 (B = bB¤(Fh) from Proposition 3.). In SS 2, when Fh1¡Fh ·(FhFm)ml;µ, they increase
with Fh from Propositions A1 (ii)(b) and 3 (B = B
¤
(Fh)), while when
Fh
1¡Fh > (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ, they
increase with Fh because NI=
1
1¡°b(1+r)fAM(Fh)®(1¡Fh)1¡®¡(1+r)[ehFh+em(1¡Fh)]g (note fwh>fwm) and average utility equals a constant times NI from the proof of Proposition A1 (ii)(a),
Proposition 3 (Fm = 1¡Fh, B =B¤(Fh;Fm); and P = µ), and (37). Since NI and average
utility of SS 1 equal those when Fh
Fm
=(Fh
Fm
)hm and Fm = 1¡Fh, and the above proof of their
being increasing in Fh when
Fh
1¡Fh >(
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ applies when
Fh
1¡Fh 2(fwm¡1[1¡°b(1+r)°b eh];(FhFm)hm] as
well, these variables of SS 2 are strictly smaller than those of SS 1. In SS 4, they increase
with Fh and Fm from Propositions A1 (ii)(a) and 3 (B = B
¤(Fh;Fm)). In SS 4, they are
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highest when b¤(fwm)= eh and b¤(wl)= em,P (Fh;Fm;B¤(Fh;Fm))AT = 1¡°b(1+r)°b em; because
they are highest on b¤(wl) = em from Figure 5 and increase with Fh among steady states
on the locus from (26) and their expressions in the proof of Proposition A1 (ii)(a). (Note
that the absolute value of the slope of the locus is less than 1.) The highest NI and average
utility of SS 4 are strictly lower than those of SS 3, since the latter coincide with those when
Fh
Fm
=(Fh
Fm
)hm and b
¤(wl)=em. They are also strictly lower than those of SS 2, since they are
highest at b¤(fwm) = eh in both SSs. They are at the inﬁnimum when Fh! 0 in SS 3, and
when Fh
Fm
= fwm¡1[1¡°b(1+r)°b em] and Fh! 0 in SS 4, hence the inﬁnima equal 0. The inﬁnima
of SS 2 are strictly higher than the ones in SS 3 and 4, since the former coincide with the
NI and average utility at the intersection of b¤(fwm)=em and b¤(wl)=em of SS 4.
(ii) In SS 3, Y increases with Fh from Propositions A2 (i) and 3 (B = bB¤(Fh)), and YMY
is constant from the proof of Proposition A2 (i) and (31). Y is strictly lower than in SS
1, since it increases with Fh when b
¤(wl) > em too. In SS 2, when Fh < F
y
h , Y increases
with Fh from Propositions A2 (ii)(b) and 3 (B = B
¤
(Fh)). From the proof of Proposition A2
(ii)(b) and (39), Y =AM(Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh)))
1¡®Fh+
°B
1¡°B¡°b(1+r)[AM(Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh)))
1¡®Fh¡(1+r)(eh+
Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh))em)Fh](the ﬁrst term is YM): Hence,
YM
Y
=f1+ °B
1¡°B¡°b(1+r) [1¡1+rAM (
eh
(Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh)))1¡®
+
em(Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh)))
®)]g¡1 and YM
Y
increases (decreases) with [Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh))]
¡1 for [Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh))]
¡1>
(<) ®
1¡®
em
eh
, where ®
1¡®
em
eh
> fwm¡1[1¡°b(1+r)°b em] can be proved as follows. First, Assumption 2
implies ®AM((
Fh
Fm
)hm)
¡(1¡®) > eh
°b
, ®AM(FhFm)¡(1¡®)¡ (1+ r)eh < (1¡®)AM(FhFm)®¡ (1+ r)em at
Fh
Fm
=(°b®AM
eh
)
1
1¡®,AM®®(1¡®)1¡®> e
®
h
°b
[eh¡°b(1+r)(eh¡em)]1¡®: Then, the last equation proves
®
1¡®
em
eh
>fwm¡1[1¡°b(1+r)°b em],°b(1¡®)AM( ®1¡® emeh )®>em,AM®®(1¡®)1¡®> e®he1¡®m°b . When Fh¸
F yh and
Fh
1¡Fh · (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ, Y ,
YM
Y
; and CBM
PCB
increase with Fh from Propositions A2 (ii)(b) and
3 (B = B
¤
(Fh)). When
Fh
1¡Fh >(
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ; Y increases with Fh from Proposition 3 (Fm = 1¡Fh
and P =µ) and the proof of Proposition A2 (ii)(a) (Y =AM(Fh)
®(1¡Fh)1¡®), and YMY =1 and
CBM
PCB
=1 from Proposition 3 (YT = 0): The highest Y of SS 2 (at b
¤(fwm)=eh) is strictly lower
than Y of SS 1, because the latter coincides with Y when Fh
Fm
=(Fh
Fm
)hm and Fm = 1¡Fh, and
the above proof of Y increasing with Fh applies when
Fh
1¡Fh 2(fwm¡1[1¡°b(1+r)°b eh];(FhFm)hm] as well.
In SS 4, Y increases with Fh and FM from Propositions A2 (ii)(a) and 3 (B=B
¤(Fh;Fm)).
Since Y =AM(Fh)
®(Fm)
1¡®+ °B
1¡°B¡°b(1+r) [AM(Fh)
®(Fm)
1¡®¡(1+r)(ehFh+emFm)] from the proof
of Proposition A2 (ii)(a) and (35), YM
Y
=f1+ °B
1¡°B¡°b(1+r) [1¡1+rAM (eh(
Fh
Fm
)1¡®+em(FhFm)
¡®)]g¡1 and
thus YM
Y
increases (decreases) with Fh
Fm
for Fh
Fm
> (<) ®
1¡®
em
eh
. From Figure 5, for given Fh
Fm
, Y
in SS 4 is strictly lower than in SS 2. Thus, the highest Y in SS 4 is strictly lower than in
SS 2. The inﬁnimum in SS 2 is proved to be strictly higher than in SS 3 and 4 in the same
way as (i).
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